* Continuation. Beginning in No. 7-12 / 2006, 1-2 / 2007

To the 90th anniversary of Russian naval aviation

Be-6PLO

The naval command constantly reminded the leadership of the naval aviation about the need to pay attention to the equipment of aircraft with the means to ensure the search and destruction of the GSh, without waiting for the state program to build special anti-submarine aircraft and helicopters to be implemented. But even without a reminder from above, the absence of aviation weapons against submarines in service with naval aviation has long caused concern among the leadership, which was once again evidenced by the speech of the chief of aviation staff of the Navy, Major General of Aviation A.M. Shuginin at summing up the annual results back in 1953.

"Essentially, we do not have special aircraft to combat submarines, as well as means of their search and destruction." The fairness of such an assessment did not raise objections, since the naval aviation practically did not solve such a task in the last war. After the war, the main attention was paid primarily to the development of strike aircraft and means of destruction of ships, the experience and knowledge of German specialists was studied and practically used, and anti-submarine aviation was in the background. Apparently, there were no materials and German specialists in anti-submarine weapons. I had to solve all the problems on my own, looking closely at foreign experience. The first studies in relation to aviation anti-submarine weapons were carried out by the branch of the Central Research Institute No. 30 of the Moscow Region and other organizations since the early 1950s. They were of a narrowly focused nature and were limited to the assessment of the physical fields of submarines, the development of elementary means of their detection: the "Baku" RGS, magnetometers and, in part, weapons. The created means of searching for submarines were not tied to a specific type of aircraft, and the methods of using them did not yet have a sufficient justification, tested by practice. After a short time, the development of anti-submarine forces and means had to pay more attention, expand the circle of specialists and spend significant funds.

To begin with, it was necessary to decide on the aircraft, for equipping them with anti-submarine means of search and destruction of submarines being developed. In principle, piston aircraft were suitable for this: Tu-4, Tu-2 and Be-6.

The Tu-4 aircraft had a long range and flight duration, but it was difficult to maintain, and its operation was quite expensive. In addition, the proposal on the need to have an anti-submarine aircraft with similar characteristics of range and duration of flight would hardly receive support, especially from high-ranking officials.

With the beginning of retraining for Tu-14 and Il-28 jet aircraft, there were quite a lot of practically new Tu-2s that became unnecessary. However, the Tu-2 also did not fall, and the choice was stopped at the Be-6. The main considerations that were guided in this were reduced to the following simple logic: the aircraft are new, serially built, have a relatively long flight duration (in the overload version), a sufficient margin of safety for the airframe for flights at low altitudes; low speed according to modern concepts, providing good maneuverability, which was considered necessary for an anti-submarine aircraft.

Torpedo 45-36 ABA and mine AMD-500, suspended under the wing of the Be-6

Discharge from the Be-6PLO small bombs PLAB-MK

True, one more important circumstance was taken into account - in 1954, Il-28R reconnaissance aircraft began to enter the naval aviation, in the near future Tu-16R was expected. The seasonality of operation of the Be-6, forced to stand idle on the shore in winter, reduced their value, and there were enough complaints about this. The all-weather Be-6, unfortunately, did not have all-season capability, and it was threatened with the fate of being out of work with all the ensuing consequences. A rather weak argument in favor of the Be-6 was also the fact that it was used for testing and testing anti-submarine weapons, and therefore, its re-equipment would not take much time, given the presence of significant free volumes in the boat. At the same time, attention was not focused on the complexity of the operation of flying boats and the seasonality of their use.

But an aircraft cannot be considered anti-submarine in the absence of at least means of detecting submarines following in a submerged position. Similar means, based on the detection of acoustic and magnetic fields of submarines, appeared on the aircraft of the US and British navies during the Second World War.

Acoustic detection means were considered more preferable, since the aquatic environment, exceeding the air density by 800 times, is the most "transparent" for detecting noise from submarines. Acoustic vibrations propagate in water with less losses than in air, and therefore over long distances. The first submarine detection RGS in our country, called "Baku", was manufactured at the end of 1952. It was installed on a Be-6 aircraft and from July to November 1953 tested on the Black Sea near Poti (the aircraft was based on Lake Paleostomi). They showed that the diesel submarine of Project 613, which followed at a depth of 50 m in a six-node course (11.2 km / h), was detected by passive non-directional buoys of the RSB-N type ("Iva") at ranges up to 2000 m. The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy signed an Act with a conclusion on the operability of the equipment. Tests in the Barents Sea showed higher detection ranges, which was explained by the better hydrological conditions of the Arctic seas.

The radio-hydroacoustic system was adopted by the naval aviation in 1955. No one could have assumed that the primitive system, insignificantly altering, would be in service for almost thirty years.

The RGS "Baku" includes: a radio-frequency set of 18 discarded buoys RGB-N and an onboard automatic radio receiver SPA-RU-55 with a radio compass. The buoys consisted of a body that contained an electronic unit, power supplies, a mechanism for setting the time of flooding, etc. The parachute system was attached to the body. An electroacoustic transducer of magnetostrictive type was used as a hydrophone, which was submerged into the water on a cable up to 18 m. The aircraft crew was able, using SPARU-55, to receive and listen to signals from RSL information transmitters at ranges of up to 60-70 km, and to output aircraft to their drive. By identifying the noises accepted by the RSL with those previously memorized, the crew could judge their belonging. The cost of the RSL-N buoy in the series was 400 rubles. In 1961, the RSL-NM Chinara buoys, worth 800 rubles, began to arrive, with about the same capabilities as the Iva, but with better weight and dimensions. They had a piezoceramic type hydrophone buried on a cable up to 100 m. The buoys were equipped with an autostart system, which turned on the information transmitter only when a certain sound pressure was reached on the hydrophone. The performance of the buoys was ensured when the sea state was up to 3 points.

In the second quarter of 1949, 0KB-470, which belonged to the 4th department of the State Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers for aircraft engineering, received an order for five prototypes of an aircraft magnetometer, which was developed under the name MOP-51 - a submarine detection magnetometer - "Chita". By 1953, the order was completed, the magnetometers were first tested on the RVU-6A aircraft, and then on the Be-6.

In accordance with the order of the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated November 26, 1956, the MAP was instructed to produce in 1957 50 sets of APM-56. The magnetometer provided registration of the increase in the Earth's magnetic field (anomaly) caused by the presence of a ferromagnetic mass. After conversion, the received signal was fed to a dial milliammeter and a strip chart recorder. The detection range of the first post-war submarines (displacement 800-1000 tons) did not exceed 200-220 m.

Consequently, if an aircraft equipped with a magnetometer flew at an altitude of 50 m and the search object was at the same depth, then the bandwidth within which, based on geometric constructions, the signal could be recorded, was 300 m, and practically less.

In 1955, the first generation submarine search means were tested, and it remained to order their production.

The year before, the PLAB-MK small-caliber anti-submarine aerial bomb entered service. She had a weight of 7.54 kg, the amount of explosive - 0.74 kg and was blown up when it hit the submarine's hull. Bombs were used from box holders in series.

Radio-hydroacoustic buoys RSL-N "Iva" and RSL-NM "Chinara"

Antenna of the PSBN-M radar station in the extended position

Submarine mark but at a depth of 100 m using a Be-6 magnetometer

In 1964, the PLAB-250-120 and PLAB-50 anti-submarine bombs were adopted. The first was equipped with a non-contact hydroacoustic fuse, and the second - with a non-contact magnetoelectric and contact fuses.

The subsequent showed that the conversion of the Be-6 into anti-submarine missiles did not occur so quickly due to the delay in the arrival of equipment. We also met with significant difficulties, which at first did not pay attention, and perhaps they misunderstood something.

The main trouble was that the Be-6 did not have a cargo compartment, and 16 external positions were used for the suspension of the RSL under the consoles and center section, which nullified the aircraft's search capabilities. Subsequently, without further ado, representatives of the Northern Fleet aviation suggested loading 27 Iva buoys inside the boat and dumping it manually. Placing buoys in the boat made it possible to hang two cassettes with PLAB-MK bombs under the center section. This option was formally called search and shock, but only for reports.

Problems arose with the installation of the APM-56 magnetometer. In order to avoid interference with the operation of the magnetically sensitive unit (MHB), it was necessary to choose a place on the plane where the level of interference would be minimal. An attempt to install the MChB on the console ended in failure, in the end, they came to the conclusion that it was necessary to dismantle the Il-KB aft turret and install the MChB on the bar under the non-magnetic fairing.

The conversion of Be-6 aircraft to anti-submarine aircraft in the Baltic and the Black Sea began in 1954, the RGS "Baku" was installed on the aircraft of the Northern Fleet in 1955, and on the aircraft of the Pacific Fleet in 1956-1957.

By 1959, of the 95 Be-6 aircraft that were available in the Navy, they were converted into 40 anti-submarine aircraft (PLO aircraft, in the terminology of that period).

The search for the most acceptable ways to create anti-submarine aviation did not always agree with logic and common sense. This was evidenced by the proposals of the Be-6 aircraft lobbyists to increase their number and resume production, which was discontinued in 1957 after the delivery of 100 aircraft to the Navy.

Such a position in practice would mean a return to outdated technologies and would not contribute to the development of a new type of aviation at the modern level. In addition, and it was well known, frequent contact with seawater and the influence of microorganisms significantly reduced the life cycle of seaplanes. The rather well-functioning Be-6 aircraft did not escape this fate. Due to the corrosion of the airframe structural parts, the flight weight of the aircraft in 1957 had to be reduced by 2,000 kg, two years later, an indication was followed to reduce it by another 2,000 kg. In the early 1960s, after two Be-6 disasters at low altitude in approximately the same conditions, it was decided on the basis of 318 omplap in Donuzlav to additionally check some characteristics of stability and controllability that were in doubt. However, after an external examination of the aircraft, the frames and ribs of which protruded like the ribs of exhausted cows, whose milkmaids were in a binge for a week, they did not dare to conduct tests. The condition of the aircraft was affected by long-term duty on the water without ascending to land, during which waves mercilessly beat them. Nevertheless, Be-6 aircraft were in the service of naval aviation for more than a quarter of a century.

Despite the low capabilities, imperfect equipment, the Be-6 aircraft opened the era of anti-submarine aviation and laid the foundations for the tactics of its use. And the great merit in this belongs to Colonels R.V. Kalmykov, L.V. Tereshchenko, Lieutenant Colonels Heine Yu.M., Ishmetyev, Captain Vorobyov, instructor of the Naval Academy Colonel N.M. Lavrentiev and many others.

During the period when the Be-6s were being converted, the anti-submarine defense zone was divided into long-range and near. The far zone did not have a permanent external border, and until the mid-fifties it was customary to limit it to a border of 600-800 km from the maritime sector. They decided on the far zone, but they could not come to a common opinion regarding the depth of the near zone, which, however, did not matter much. There were many proposals and justifications, and scholastic disputes did not stop for a long time. And at one of the meetings, the commander-in-chief of the Navy, Admiral S.G. Gorshkov, in order to bring the "eggheads" out of the impasse, determined that the outer boundary of the near ASW zone would be located at a distance from the coast up to 100 miles (185 km). This is how the highly scientific rationale "from the lantern" appeared, and for some reason it suited everyone. In any case, there were no opponents at the meeting. Sufficiently effective stationary hydroacoustic means of detecting underwater targets in the Navy by this time, as, indeed, and later, did not appear, and they came to the conclusion that it was necessary to control the near zone with the help of the fleet's maneuverable forces.

Helicopters were considered promising aircraft for solving anti-submarine missions in coastal areas, and here our Navy went "its own way".

It is known from the history of aviation that the first helicopter took off only in 1907. It had no controls, and mechanics held it to avoid collapse. But nevertheless, the helicopter got off the ground by one and a half meters! 35 years have passed, and the June issue of the Washington Post newspaper informed its readers about the demonstration flight of the helicopter, the name of which comes from two words - the Greek helix - propeller and pteron - wing. This very accurately conveys the principle of flight of this type of aircraft, and therefore in translation into Russian it is more appropriate to use the name - "rotorcraft", and not devoid of meaning and logic "helicopter". Moreover, the authorship of the last name is disputed by different people. So in one of the television programs, the famous science fiction writer Kazantsev claimed that it was he who proposed a similar name. Some consider NI Kamov to be the author.

Mi-4PLO with "Kurs" radar

The development of helicopters in our country least of all resembled a triumphal march. Ultimately, the most successful was the Mi-4 helicopter designed by M.L. Mile. Its first samples were delivered in a transport and combat version and were already converted into search and rescue units in naval aviation units.

The development of the Mi-4 helicopter began in 1951, and the following year it entered service.

Aerodynamically, this is a single-rotor helicopter with a tail rotor located on the tail boom. The main rotor of the helicopter is four-bladed, on the first machines of a mixed design (steel tubular spar and a wooden frame with plywood sheathing) with a blade resource of only 150 hours, and only after a complex of constructive and technological measures (and a number of disasters!) four rose. Helicopters of the latest series were equipped with propellers with metal blades, equipped with devices for monitoring the condition of the side members before flight. Tail rotor three-bladed wooden construction, pushing.

The power plant of the helicopter included an ALU-82V piston engine (two-row eighteen-cylinder star) with a capacity of 1870 l / s. with forced air cooling. The engine was located obliquely relative to the nose of the helicopter, above it was the cockpit. To reduce engine speed and transfer torque to the propellers, a main gearbox with bevel gears, planetary gears and a freewheel was used.

The helicopter was controlled in two ways. It was produced using a swashplate, a tail rotor and a combined step-gas system. Since the movement of the controls required an effort of several hundred kilograms, the system includes irreversible and reversible hydraulic boosters, as well as spring loading mechanisms.

The aerobatic navigation equipment of the helicopter made it possible to fly day and night in simple and difficult meteorological conditions. The propeller blades and cockpit glazing had an alcohol anti-icing system.

With the arrival of the first Mi-4 helicopters in the SF aviation on December 12, 1954, the formation of the 2053rd separate helicopter squadron began at the airfield of the Shongui village of the Murmansk region. By the end of the year, it had nine helicopters.

The Black Sea Fleet aircraft received the first two Mi-4 helicopters in August 1954, and two months later captains Voronin and Baglaev took part in the fleet exercises.

In June 1955, at the Kos airfield, the 509th separate helicopter squadron of the BF aviation was formed, where the first machines arrived.

The Pacific Fleet's aviation received Mi-4 helicopters in 1954. They became part of the formed 505 separate helicopter squadron based at the Sedanka airfield near Vladivostok. The most experienced and respected pilot Major G.P. Khaidukov was appointed as the squadron commander. In the same year, the helicopter piloted by him crashed under unclear circumstances. This was preceded by the following events. Geologists turned to the aviation headquarters of the Pacific Fleet for help, who urgently needed to take out a seriously ill member of the expedition from an area remote from the taiga village of Kartun (Primorsky Territory) deep into the taiga by 160 km. Due to heavy snow drifts, the evacuation on tractors threatened to drag on, and the patient would not have survived. The request was granted, and the helicopter arrived at the designated area. There was no landing site, and they decided to take the patient in hover mode, which ended in a helicopter accident. Due to the impossibility of evacuation, the helicopter was destroyed on the spot. The patient did not survive.

In June 1959, the 555th helicopter regiment was formed at the Ochakov airfield, the first five Mi-4 helicopters arrived in the same year.

On the basis of the Mi-4 helicopter, it was decided to create an anti-landing variant. Considering the amount of improvements, this turned out to be not an easy task. The helicopter's anti-submarine equipment included: RGS "Baku", magnetometer APM-56, radar SPRS-1, equipment and systems for suspension and use of bombs and buoys, optical bomber sight OPB-1R.

The SPRS-1 radar provided an overview in the front hemisphere. The image of the terrain on the screen of this radar seemed so mysterious that it took extraordinary imagination to identify it and compare it with known landmarks. But navigators rarely used it, since the radar was distinguished by an enviable failure and most often did not work in flight.

Helicopter RGS "Baku", with the exception of some details, is similar to that installed on the Be-6. The work of the crew and the use of search equipment on the helicopter were hampered by the vibration of structural elements in flight, a significant level of noise in the cockpits, the presence of uncompensated electromagnetic fields and other troubles inherent in helicopters that swing propellers

To ensure the operation of the magnetometer, its MChB was placed in a fairing (nacelle) made of non-magnetic material, which was in a retracted position on the outside of the cargo compartment behind it. Before use, the MChB was produced on a 36 m long cable cable and was towed by a helicopter. A tribute should be paid to the creators of the in-flight exhaust and cleaning system of this ingenious device. Their imagination and ingenuity in terms of mechanizing labor-intensive processes did not surpass the level of the Middle Ages by much. Such a conclusion suggested itself already at the first glance at the clumsy heavy winch with a manual drive for releasing and lifting the MChB. The not very intellectual task associated with these operations was assigned to the navigator. Having received the permission of the crew commander, he went to the rear of the cargo compartment, gave up the winch stopper, installed it on the handle, and then, counting the revolutions, released the gondola, controlling the length of the released chost by the marks on the cable rope. After that, the navigator connected the cable-cable with the counterpart on the winch body. After completing the feat of labor and remembering the talented creators of the mechanism with a kind "kind word", the navigator returned to the workplace and turned on the APM-56 equipment. When cleaning, all operations were performed in reverse order. To rotate the handle required extraordinary physical strength. The need for the navigator's reports on the transition to the rear of the helicopter was dictated by the significant dependence of the helicopter's controllability on the center of gravity, given its limited range. In the BF aviation, there was a case when, presumably in order to check how the MChB behaves in the air, three curious engineers moved to the rear of the cockpit, the helicopter lost control due to a center shift and fell on its tail. All who were on it died. After this incident, it was established that helicopters should perform all flights over the sea in pairs. After some time, they stopped paying attention to this instruction.

Mi-4M

Locator "Rubin-V"

Layout of the Mi-4M helicopter

The Mi-4M helicopter could be used in search and strike versions. In the first case, 12 RSL-N or 18 RSL-NM buoys were suspended inside the helicopter, in the second - four bombs up to 100 kg or three box holders, 50 PLAB-MK each. Four locks, external suspension hung loads up to 50 kg. They were usually used for suspension of daytime or nighttime OMABs.

For its time, the helicopter had good data: flight speed - 170 km / h; range - 350 km (altitude 500-1000 m, speed 140-150 km / h), respectively, duration - 2-2.5 hours. The flight weight of the helicopter was 8030 kg, fuel supply - 900 liters.

The Mi-4M helicopters were constantly updated, the first version was followed by the Mi-4AM, then the VM, equipment, search tools, etc. were modernized.

So, since 1961, instead of the SPRS-1 radar, the helicopter was equipped with a more advanced panoramic radar "Rubin-V", the AP-31 autopilot, which the pilots, for unknown reasons, were afraid of and used very rarely and reluctantly. Apparently, domestic technology managed to make a giant leap in development, and to the indescribable joy of navigators, they were presented with a gift - the winch for the release of the MChB of the new APM-60 magnetometer was equipped with an electric drive, demonstrating how far the domestic technology and design thought had gone. At the same time, the rotor blades were replaced with metal blades of a different shape, equipped with a device for monitoring the condition of the spar, which significantly improved the stability and controllability of the helicopter, as all pilots could see.

However, such a modernization did not significantly increase the search capabilities of the helicopter, and the search for alternative solutions continued.

From reports on the pages of the foreign press, it followed that searching with the help of OGAS installed on helicopters is more economical than buoys, and provides a larger amount of information. A decision was made to create a hydroacoustic helicopter station. As a result of not very strenuous efforts, an OGAS of the AG-19 type ("Klyazma") appeared, which had only one mode of operation - noise direction finding.

There were no questions with the helicopter, there was no alternative to the Mi-4. In 1958, the AG-19 passed tests, as a result of which the detection range of the submarine pr. 613 was obtained up to 6,000 m.When searching, the helicopter with the AG-19 should be in hover mode for 5-7 minutes at an altitude of 10-15 m and to deepen the acoustic system to 30-40 m. The data obtained during tests in the process of military tests and research carried out in the 33rd center was not confirmed, and the AG-19 was written off. Some wits, not without reason, changed the third letter in the name of the station, which more accurately characterized its capabilities.

Mi-4T torpedo helicopter with a payload container under the fuselage

The attempt to create a torpedo-bomber helicopter - the Mi-4MT, which state tests were carried out in 1963-1964, was also untenable.

Since most of the flights of anti-submarine helicopters were performed over the sea, for once the management was concerned about the safety of the crews.

There was no doubt that a massive gearbox located in the upper part of the fuselage would turn the helicopter over and, having a buoyancy reserve equivalent to an ax, as studies showed, it would completely go under water in 1-1.5 minutes, blowing bubbles. In the process of splashdown and overturning, the crew was not able to leave the helicopter and was possible only after filling the cabins with water, provided that the crew saw the exit doors. This required from the crew not only iron restraint and self-control, but also conducting special training at the limit of a person's physical and moral capabilities, and even then under certain conditions. However, a self-contained breathing apparatus would not be useless under these conditions.

The problems of assessing the possibility of safely leaving the Mi-4 helicopter in the air in the 50-60s. was engaged in OKB Mil. The crew, leaving the helicopter in flight, had every chance of getting under the blades of the main or tail rotor, which did not represent a significant difference for him. And the solution looked simple enough - to separate at least the rotor blades from the hub by shooting them off with pyro charges. Test flights to shoot the blades were performed by test pilot Yu Garnaev. According to the assignment, at a given altitude, he turned on the autopilot and left the helicopter. After a set time, the main rotor blades were shot off and a dummy with a parachute was thrown out. The tests were successful, but there was no particular reason for optimism. Difficult questions arose: how to achieve that all the blades separate at the same time? In addition, it was impossible to completely exclude the erroneous actions of the crew. And everything remained unchanged.

The model of the float landing system for the Mi-4MT helicopter also ended in failure. It was supposed to install front spherical floats with a diameter of 1.4 m. An ejector is installed on each of them. The float was supposed to be attached to an annular steel pipe suspended from the front pillar. The rear floats are in the form of a torus with a cross section of 1m, also with ejectors. The floats reduced the range by 180-200 km and the fate of such an innovation was predetermined in advance.

With the arrival of the Mi-4M anti-submarine helicopters in the aviation of the fleets in 1958, it became necessary to carry out organizational and staff changes caused by an increase in the number of flight and technical personnel and, first of all, by a change in the tasks assigned to units and subunits. Almost none of the units and divisions have retained their old name. So, 509 separate aviation squadron of BF aviation helicopters was renamed into 509 UAE base PLO helicopters, 2,053 UAE helicopters of the Northern Fleet were reorganized into 830 UAE base PLO helicopters; a squadron of Black Sea Fleet helicopters deployed in 872 air defense units of base PLO helicopters; The Pacific Fleet's helicopter squadron was reorganized into 710 air defense units of base PLO helicopters and relocated to Novonezhino and Petrovka.

The Mi-4M helicopters usually solved the problem of searching for submarines near the coast, sometimes moving away up to 50-60 km. There are no landmarks over the sea, and the imperfection of the navigation equipment of the helicopter, combined with the low flight speed and increased danger of flying over the sea, did not inspire more.

The first buoys with a cable length of 18 m did not ensure the detection of submarines that followed even at a depth of 40-50 m under a layer of temperature jump, especially in the Black Sea. Repeated appeals to the naval aviation with a request to take measures and force manufacturers to supply buoys with an extended cable remained without a positive decision. The main reason for this attitude was that after the adoption of any type of technology, the industry immediately loses interest in it. But the people in the units did not differ in diplomacy, but they were smart in technology. So, in 872 of the Black Sea Fleet Aviation Regiment, realizing that there was nowhere to wait for help, and the Iva buoys had a significant buoyancy reserve, they replaced the short hydrophone cable with a 50-meter cable, using a television cable that was inexpensive at that time (16 kopecks per meter), which could be bought at any radio store. And we got out of the situation on our own.

In the same unit, as in other fleets, persistent attempts were made to improve the accuracy of bombing from helicopters on submarines following in a submerged position. Some proposals in this direction looked quite extraordinary. In particular, the navigator of the regiment, Major Pelipas, proposed the use of PLAB-MK bombs in inert equipment (without charge, filled with sand). Her hitting the submarine's hull could be recorded by the crew of the latter. Such bombs were prepared, used, but there was no information about direct hits.

Units and subdivisions of the base, and subsequently shipborne helicopters were manned mainly with flight personnel with some health limitations and were not allowed, for this reason, to be retrained for jet aircraft, and since 1959 - with pilots of disbanded fighter aviation units. From it came the commanders of the regiments Pshenichnikov, Moskalev, Safonov and others. Many of them were not very eager for such imperfect aircraft, naturally belittling, as they not without reason believed, their flying dignity and pride. There were enough rumors and speculations about the low reliability of the Mi-4 helicopters, and they were among the non-prestigious ones. And this stigma remained on them forever, despite the improvement and development of helicopters, when they no longer looked like the clumsy shakes of the first generation, and their equipment was not inferior to aircraft equipment. Many high-ranking leaders expressed disdain for the helicopter, and the commanders of the aviation of the fleets tried not to fly them.

Mi-4ME but the air parade

Suspension of small-sized PLAV for Mi-4M

In addition to everything, the staff salaries of the flight and technical personnel of helicopter units and subunits were set 20-30% lower than those of other types of aviation (except for transport units), the staff categories are lower, the prospects for obtaining a flight classification that gives benefits, and even more to confirm it (if it was received on a different type of aircraft) in the near future did not shine, since the development of flights in SMU by helicopters day and night using OSP began in units only in 1962-1963. In addition, although at that time it was not considered so important, the norms of allowance for flight personnel flying in helicopters and jet planes varied significantly both in quality and in the range of products. Helicopters were even less enthusiastic about the engineering staff. For those who got acquainted with jet technology and appreciated its advantages, the helicopter marked a return to the past of aviation with all its dubious charms: piston engines (whose pistons tended to burn out); smoked fuselages; complex gearboxes; main rotors that required checking and adjusting the dampers before each flight; transmissions, leaded gasoline, etc. The only thing that brightened up the gloomy picture was the presence of an alcohol system for washing the propeller blades and cockpit glass.

We can state with complete confidence that the appearance of helicopters did not meet with enthusiasm both among the flight and technical personnel.

With more than modest capabilities, the Mi-4M helicopters nevertheless opened the way for the next generations of helicopters of this purpose. Only with their appearance, the tactical tandem began to be practically practiced: a group of helicopters - KPUG, and naval officers, far from aviation, began to gain experience of interaction.

There were some difficulties in mastering helicopters, but, as in any business, it was not without enthusiasts. These should primarily include: A.P. Pisarenko, G.P. Khaidukova; A.N. Voronin; V. S. Pelipasa; THEM. Gershevich; G.N. Mdivani and many others.

The training and improvement of the crews of anti-submarine aircraft and helicopters were hampered by the strict limitation of the number of buoys. The Naval Aviation Headquarters considered it its task to accumulate as many of them as possible, and the fact that the crews would not be trained for their use was not taken into account. In order to get out of the situation, the selection of buoys and parachute systems and their preparation for reuse was practiced on the Black Sea. It looked like this. After completing training flights, helicopters were sent to the area to monitor the submarine, which guided the boats to the floated buoys and parachutes remaining on the surface. This practice can hardly be considered economical from the point of view of costs, but the selection of buoys was made.

Aviation equipment supplied to friendly countries was often idle, and the flight personnel retrained in our country lost their classification. It is for this reason that the leadership of the United Arab Republic (UAR) appealed on March 15, 1966 with a request to help restore equipment and prepare flight personnel on Mi-4ME helicopters. They were not slow to provide it and formed a group of 11 people (ten officers and one employee). The head of the group was appointed deputy. Squadron Commander 555 Regiment 33 Center Major B.I. Pyryev. However, the group had to deal with rough work in Egypt, drawing up job descriptions, training programs, looking for missing property and spare parts. Proceeding from this, it can be recognized that the reproach that was constantly expressed against our advisers that they are ready to repair stools, if only they were paid money, and even then, by the standards of foreign specialists, is beggarly, can be considered fair. Helicopters Mi-4ME, which had been stationed since 1964, were completed and transferred from Cairo to the Dakhil airfield (western outskirts of Alexandria). In two months, it was possible to form six flight crews and train them (after receiving ten helicopters in the third quarter of 1966, the squadron consisted of Mi-4ME). The squadron was commanded by Major El-Said El Bedevi, a pilot who trained twice in the USSR and had a high level of training. Theoretical classes with Egyptian specialists began on May 31, and after three months the program to restore, in any case, flight skills was successfully completed.

Helicopters came to ships later than aircraft, which is understandable. In order to realize the need for helicopters for various purposes on ships, it took several years and a certain level of development of science and technology.

Since the early 1960s, the navies of NATO countries have begun equipping ships of almost all classes with helicopters, starting with patrol ships. The approach was differentiated: middle-class helicopters (flight weight up to 10,000 kg) were intended for large group-based ships, light helicopters were intended for frigates and patrol ships.

However, the approaches to the composition of the equipment of shipborne helicopters and the degree of independence of decision-making by the crew turned out to be different.

The US Navy specialists believed that the information received by the helicopter crew should go to the ship and be processed by the CIUS, which performs these operations faster and more accurately onboard systems. With this approach, the helicopter crew acted independently, in accordance with the situation, only in exceptional cases, and the special crew training program was simplified.

The British Navy specialists believed that the crew should be completely autonomous in solving problems and, at their discretion, use the means of searching and classifying contact. This, in fact, explains the increased attention to middle class helicopters in England.

Domestic developers relied on the independence of the crew when solving problems, and even the BIUS that later appeared on the ships did not change anything, since they did not provide processing of search information from helicopters, but were only suitable for calculating the trajectory of maneuvering, even then very conditionally.

The beginning of shipborne helicopters in our country was laid by the rather frivolous Ka-8 designed by N.I. Kamov, first shown in the summer of 1948 at the air parade in Tushino. The helicopter with the coaxial rotor design did not make much of an impression. It was piloted by test pilot M.D. Gurov. In August of the following year, the first flight of the Ka-10 helicopter took place, in the next three years a small series of them was built.

Like its predecessor, the helicopter had a coaxial propeller configuration and a more powerful AI-4V engine of 75 hp. designs by A.G. Ivchenko. However, in the process of helicopter flights, a number of design flaws were revealed to eliminate which it took a lot of effort and extensive research.

The preference for a coaxial rotor design was explained solely by the possibility of reducing the size of the helicopter, which is important for basing on a ship, as well as the lack of a tail rotor. The disadvantages of the scheme include: a complex system of rotation and control of the propellers, insufficient directional stability at low flight speeds, a large harmful resistance of the rotor column, and a limited range of helicopter alignments.

When comparing all the pros and cons, it is difficult to make an unambiguous conclusion about the significant advantages of the coaxial scheme. But there were other opinions about its advantages, departmental, far from aerodynamics and common sense.

A large number of flights have been performed on Ka-10 helicopters. Starting from December 7, 1950 from the cruiser "Maxim Gorky" to the Baltic Fleet, flights were made "on foot" and on the move. Their intensity can be judged by their quantity. For example, a case was noted when 100 flights were made in two days. The helicopter had a float landing gear, which consisted of two inflatable ballonets. The flight weight of the helicopter did not exceed 365 kg, so there were no problems with keeping it on the deck after landing, even at a high air flow rate, and was solved simply - several people kept the helicopter from shifting behind the truss pipes that replaced the fuselage.

Research flights were performed by test pilot D.E. Efremov and Captain E.A. Gridyushko, usually in the presence of the chief designer.

The following year, a kind of presentation of the Ka-10 helicopter took place at Cape Khersones (Crimea). NI Kamov demonstrated it to Admiral S.G. Gorshkov, who commanded the Black Sea Fleet during this period. Takeoffs and landings were carried out using a limited area. This was followed by permission to land on the battleship "Novorossiysk". After a while, in the presence of the Minister of the Navy G.K. Kuznetsova, test pilot D.E. Efremov performed several flights from the battleship. Apparently, they served as a kind of impetus for organizational activities. By the mid-1950s, the ships of the Soviet Navy found themselves without helicopters capable of solving tasks in the interests of supporting them.

The designs of the first helicopters, although they were called shipborne helicopters, did not meet the requirements for an aircraft of this purpose, and work continued.

In accordance with the directive of the Naval General Staff of March 14, 1952, a full-time naval aviation unit was formed at the Black Sea Fleet - the 220th separate detachment of helicopters, whose commander was appointed Captain A.N. Voronin. Thus, March 14, 1952 can, with some reason, be considered the date of birth of shipborne helicopters (but not shipborne aviation!). By May 15 of the same year, the manning of the detachment ended, and the Kulikovo Pole aerodrome (at that time the outskirts of Sevastopol) was determined as its base. A certain historical continuity can be seen: from this airfield on September 6, 1910, the naval pilot Lieutenant S.F. Dorozhinsky. Ka-10 helicopters took part in tactical exercises, operating from the battleship Novorossiysk, cruisers Voroshilov, Frunze, and others, solving the tasks of observation, communication and visual search of submarines. On December 24, 1952, the commander of the Black Sea Fleet and the commander of the Air Force of the Black Sea Fleet signed an act recommending that the Ka-10 helicopter be adopted by the Navy. There is no doubt that this was the initiative of Kamov, whose design bureau was experiencing financial difficulties.However, the position of the aviation leadership of the Navy turned out to be more real, and in the conclusion dated January 31, 1953, signed by the Commander of the Navy Air Force, it is stated that the Ka-10 helicopter passed the test (!) , but in view of the limited carrying capacity and insufficient crew composition (one person) for solving problems, it is inappropriate to take it into service. The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy approved the conclusion. Beginning in August 1950, OKB-2 (from the fall of 1951 - OKB-4) began pre-sketch design of the Ka-15 two-seater shipborne helicopter. The development of the draft design was carried out the next year, and on June 9, the order of the deputy. Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR N.I. Bulganin about the beginning of financing of work on the Ka-15.

(To be continued)

Photo by V.Drushlyakov

Nikolay MAKSIMOV

Is it possible to determine the weight (mass) of an object from the readings of the magnetometer?

You can determine the approximate size, shape, and depth of an object. But weight is not allowed. The fact is that to determine the mass of an object, you need to know some things about it:

• the magnetization of the object, and it changes, depending on the steel grade, in a very wide range;
• the exact shape of the object. There are calculated formulas only for homogeneous objects of a simple shape - a ball, a cylinder, a parallelepiped, etc. And any artificial object has a complex shape, and, moreover, is often heterogeneous, that is, it consists of different parts that have their own, special properties;

The lack of this necessary information does not allow calculating the mass. A simple example: the magnetic field from a 1 kg weight is several times stronger than from 1 kg of nails made of the same steel, poured into a glass jar. And if you scatter these nails in a line, then the field will again change both shape and size. This is explained by the fact that each nail, being a separate magnet, has its own positive and negative pole. Folding in the bank chaotically, these magnets compensate each other, "quench" the general field, which does not happen in a monolithic weight. By the way, this is why the total field from tank tracks is often small - each track is magnetized differently during the manufacturing process. But the cannon barrel is a monolith, and the field from it is tens of times stronger.

However, the size, shape and depth of an object are enough information to decide whether or not to dig! Roughly speaking, you can always tell a nail from a helmet, and a helmet from heavy equipment.

Are there non-magnetic tanks?

Recently, a legend has spread among search engines that during the Second World War the Germans had tanks, partly made of titanium, and these tanks are non-magnetic.
Firstly, no one has yet found titanium tanks. Secondly, even if such parts of the tank as tracks, wheels, and even armor plates are made of titanium, then the engine, mechanisms, gun will still be steel, and these are huge magnetic masses and strong fields that are "taken" magnetometer from a great distance.

Are the magnetometer readings different in air and underground (under water, concrete, ice, etc.)?

No, they do not differ, because there are no natural barriers to the magnetic field. That is why all tests magnetometers, Unlike metal detectorth, can be carried out in air or on the surface of the earth.

Why don't you integrate a GPS system into your magnetometer?

Let's see what they are used for magnetometers... First, for searching for iron objects, 90% of which are searched for "on a tip", i.e. the place is determined in advance, you just need to confirm whether there is an object or not. There is no need for a built-in GPS, just a map or a village shepherd who "jumped from the tower of a tank into the river as a boy!"

Secondly, magnetometer needed for filming when it is necessary to build magnetic maps. But here GPS is all the more unnecessary, since this type of work requires a binding accuracy of at least 20-30 cm, and GPS declares at best 3-5 meters, and in many cases "bounces" up to 15-20 meters!

You can, of course, insert from the position "so it was!", But the fact is that the additional complication of any device leads to an increase in its weight, energy consumption, and, most importantly, to a decrease in its reliability.

What is the most sensitive magnetometer?

The most sensitive so-called cryogenic magnetometersbased on the phenomenon of superconductivity. Their sensitivity reaches 0, 0001 nT. However, in the practice of field work, a sensitivity higher than 1 nT is not used, since it is practically impossible to isolate an anomaly less than 5-10-20 nT during field work, and even more so during exploratory work - there is too much interference. Usually manufacturers of field devices declare sensitivity up to 0.1 nT, but such sensitivity is needed only for special types of scientific work.

What anomaly does the tank give?

The anomaly from the tank, like from any magnetized object, is highly dependent on the distance. Therefore, the magnitude of the field, say, 10,000 nT can be obtained from both the tank and the nail, it is worth bringing it closer. Therefore, it is best to navigate not by numbers, but by the size and shape of the anomaly: the anomaly from the tank is large in area, it is most often an elongated spot on the surface with a size of ten to fifteen meters, if the tank is at a depth of 3-5 meters; and up to 3-4 meters in size if it is at a depth of 8-10 meters. In the first case, the intensity of the anomalous spot increases sharply towards the center; in the second, this change is much less pronounced.

Can a pedestrian magnetometer be used to find magnetic objects underwater?

- Yes. In the summer, you can use it from a non-magnetic wooden boat (the rubber boat "spins" strongly, which creates interference), but it is better to carry out research of reservoirs in winter on ice.

What did you find with your Magnum magnetometer?

According to the owners of our devices, over 4 years of its production, about 12 pieces of heavy equipment were found (3 of them were exploded in parts) and a large number of smaller objects.

Amphibian "Be"

The beginning of the construction of the Be-12, as mentioned earlier, refers to 1956 ... the timing of its submission for testing was repeatedly postponed and, finally, on November 29, 1968, by order of the Minister of Defense of the USSR, it was put into service.

In all fairness, the blame for the delay in the creation of the aircraft in equal steps can be divided between the customer and the manufacturer. If the first could not decide for a long time what he needed, then the second - to imagine what is required of him. But there were also subjective reasons: during this period, the design bureau of G.M.Beriev devoted relatively little time to the Be-12 aircraft, directing its main efforts towards creating the prestigious Be-10, which, unfortunately, turned out to be unpromising.

In one of the first versions, the Be-12 was supposed to have a tricycle landing gear with a nose-steered wheel and a retractable fairing with a circular radar antenna. Subsequently, this was abandoned and given preference (for a number of reasons, some of which were not devoid of logic) the so-called "classical" scheme with a tail-steered wheel, however, making it very difficult to perform takeoff and landing. At the same time, it was necessary to cut the antenna mirror of the onboard radar, placing it in the nose of the fuselage and restricting the view to the forward sector, which clearly does not represent significant advantages over stations with all-round visibility. As a result, the plane acquired a somewhat curious look, which served as an occasion for countless witticisms.

The tests of the Be-12 were led by the leading pilot G. G. Yevtushenko. Military testers, pilots and navigators were also involved: Colonel A. S. Sushko, E. M. Nikitin, Lieutenant Colonels A. T. Zakharov, V. V. Davydov. The tests did not go smoothly, and according to their results, rather large improvements had to be made: to increase the height of the engines on the wing due to their flooding during takeoff and landing, change a number of landing gear units, install mechanisms and power drives for controlling the tail wheel, re-arrange the cockpits ...

Takeoff from the water. Donuzlav hydroaerodrome. 1968 year

The Be-12 amphibious aircraft is built according to a high-wing design with spaced rudders and a power plant consisting of two AI-20D turboprop engines designed by A.G. Ivchenko, with a capacity of 5180 equivalent horsepower.

An amphibian glider consists of a boat, a wing with underwing floats designed for lateral stability afloat, and a tail unit.

The boat is an all-metal construction, equipped in the lower part with two steps, the first step being high. The bottom of the boat is flat-pitched with variable deadlift from 25e at the first stage to 40 ° in the bow. The boat is divided by hermetically sealed bulkheads into 10 compartments, eight of which are watertight. According to the calculations, the aircraft was supposed to remain afloat if two adjacent compartments were damaged.

In front of the boat, along the sides, spray deflectors are reinforced. On the sides of the middle honor, niches are made to accommodate the main landing gear legs in the retracted position and strong flaps are installed to increase the stability of the aircraft on planing. The water rudder is installed at the rear of the boat bottom. All parts of the latter have different types of coating for corrosion protection. The length of the boat, including the radar fairing and the magnetometer unit, is 30.1 m. The floating draft is 1.55 m (the chassis is removed).

The lower part of the boat is equipped with a cut-out for a bomb bay six meters long, ea-crumbling with hydraulically controlled doors and sealing hoses. The upper part of the fuselage is also equipped with a hatch for loading the aircraft with means of search and destruction while afloat (according to the experience of operating the aircraft, they were never used for their intended purpose).

The wing of the aircraft is trapezoidal in plan, caisson, cantilever, type "Seagull" with a positive angle on the center section of the order of 20 ° and negative on the rest. The wing is made of two spars, has a span of 29.84 m and consists of a center section, two middle and two detachable parts. Flaps are attached to the wing, the release and retraction of which is carried out using hydraulic motors. Eight wing compartments are used for soft fuel tanks (located in the center section). In the caissons of the middle part of the wing, there are two tank compartments.

The tail unit consists of a stabilizer with an elevator and spaced rudders.

The Be-12 then turned out to be the world's largest amphibious vehicle. However, amphibiousness was achieved by a significant weighting of the structure, if we take into account that the chassis with support devices weighed about 2000 kg. The wheels of the main landing gear with a diameter of 1300 mm were made specifically for the Be-12, equipped with a 32-layer cord and turned out to be quite expensive to manufacture. However, all layers of the cord were instantly erased as a result of one careless pressing on the brake pedal at high aircraft speed (most often this happened during the takeoff run).

It was assumed that the aircraft would be mainly used from the water (in practice, this happens quite rarely), so the wheel brakes were not equipped with drums with an effective heat sink, and when flying in high temperatures, they sometimes overheated.

In order to provide the best conditions for using the magnetometer, the tail wheel strut, like the largest structural elements, is made of titanium alloys.

Aircraft control is manual, bus-free with mixed wiring. The cockpit has two steering columns and double rudder pedals. The tail wheel and water rudder are also pedal operated.

The Be-12 rescue and marine equipment includes an inflatable boat LAS-5M, an emergency radio station, anchors, signal flags, a megaphone, a line thrower with a 200 m cable, and other equipment.

The AI-20D turboprop engines (from the second to the fourth series) are equipped with four AV-68D flapping screws with a diameter of 5 m.

The fuel for the operation of the engines and the turbine generator set is placed in the main tanks with a capacity of 9000 kg. It is planned to install an additional fuel tank in the cargo compartment with a capacity of 1800 liters, but it was practically never used, and many did not even suspect about this possibility. In order to ensure a safer landing in an emergency, it is possible to drain 5000 liters of fuel in flight in six minutes.

To start the main engines in autonomous basing conditions and to provide power to the aircraft in the event of failure of the main sources, there is an AI-8 turbine generator located in the aft part. Its launch and use is possible up to an altitude of 3000 m.

During the development of the aircraft, there was an opinion about the need to equip flying boats with devices for refueling them in the open sea (ocean) from specially equipped tanker submarines. On the Be-12 aircraft, the refueling unit is located in the front of the fuselage on the right. The refinement of structural elements and equipment for refueling afloat was carried out on Be-6 aircraft, which had better seaworthiness compared to the Be-12. Subsequently, evaluating all the pros and cons, they came to the conclusion that refueling was inappropriate, both for tactical reasons and for safety. And they left the refueling unit on the planes.

The aircraft's crew consists of four people (two pilots, a navigator and a radio operator). They are located in two leaky cockpits, which, in fact, limited the ceiling of the aircraft to 8000 m, and also contributed to a significant level of noise in the cockpit. Pilots' workplaces are equipped with ejection seats. The second cabin houses the radio operator. If necessary, he leaves the plane through a special side hatch equipped with a folding aerodynamic flap. The crew's parachutes also contained emergency supplies.

To create more or less comfortable conditions, the crew cabins are equipped with a ventilation and heating system. The air for the system is taken from the last stages of the engine compressors.

Passing through the air conditioning unit, the air was heated or cooled. But the system turned out to be ineffective at high outside air temperatures - the air temperature in the cabins when flying at low altitudes was sometimes clearly tropical - 30-40 °.

The aircraft's flight weight (normal) is 35000 kg (combat load - 1600 kg, fuel - 9000 kg), maximum flight speed - 518 km / h, cruising speed - 420-460 km / h, maximum flight range - 3300 km (if the flight is "Along the ceilings", ie, as the fuel depletes, the flight altitude gradually increases), if the flight is made at an altitude of 4000 m, then the range is 2700 km. According to the accepted methodology, the capabilities of anti-submarine aircraft are assessed by the tactical radius — the ability to solve a tactical problem at a certain distance from the home airfield. The tactical radius of the Be-12 aircraft with a stay in the area of \u200b\u200bthree hours in this case is 600-650 km.

The aircraft's bombardment and torpedo armament provides the ability to suspend hydroacoustic buoys, bombs and torpedoes. Accordingly, this allows you to change the aircraft loading options and use it in the search, strike and search and strike versions (in the search version, up to 90 buoys can be suspended on the aircraft, in the search and shock version - 36 buoys and an AT-1 torpedo, in the shock version - three AT torpedoes -1). For bombing visually visible targets (mainly for training purposes) on the plane, there is an NKPB-7 night collimator sight. However, for a number of reasons, its use is limited to a very narrow range of altitudes and flight speeds.

The Be-12 aircraft is equipped with modern flight and navigation equipment.

The aircraft designers attempted to combine search information sensors, means of its secondary processing, sighting and computing devices and flight and navigation equipment into a single system. But it is customary to call a system an ordered set of elements that have any connections. On the Be-12, there were elements, but there were no connections between them. For this reason, the Be-12 anti-submarine equipment can only be called a system conditionally. Nevertheless, it is referred to as a search and sighting device (PPS-12) and includes the "Baku" radio-hydroacoustic system, an APM-60E aircraft magnetometer, an "Initiative ^" radar station, an ANP-1V-1 automatic navigation device, a Doppler ground speed and drift angle DISS-1, sighting and computing device PVU-S "Lilac-2", autopilot AP-6E and other equipment.

In accordance with the tactical and technical requirements, the aircraft equipment was supposed to include equipment for detecting the submarine's thermal wake, called "Gagara". We will dwell on some episodes related to this equipment below.

The main source of information about the underwater situation remained sonar buoys. The SPARU-55 receiving device installed on the aircraft does not have electrical connections with the elements included in the search and targeting system. The data obtained with the help of buoys about the place and elements of movement of the submarine are entered into the sighting-computing device by the navigator manually.

The second means of detecting a submarine going underwater is the APM-60E aircraft search magnetometer. Its magnetically sensitive unit is located under the fairing in the tail boom. Just like its prototype, the magnetometer is a fluxgate magnetometer, but it has the best noise immunity, sensitivity, and modern (naturally, the level of the late 50s) technology is used in its design.

The equipment developed under the Gagara index was supposed to register the thermal contrast of the wake jet from the submarine by infrared radiation. In order to reveal the difference between the surrounding water environment and the submarine wake, a special optical system was used, which consisted of two scanning mirrors, a lens objective, condensers, filters, a radiation receiver and other details.

In 1963-1964. an experimental set of "Gagar" equipment entered the factory tests, which were completed in October 1964 (the first stage). The prototype did not meet the tactical and technical requirements - its sensitivity turned out to be an order of magnitude lower than the specified value (0.1 0 instead of 0.01 0 specified by TTT). In addition, during the daytime, the equipment could be used very limitedly due to the high level of interference.

The first serious enough failures did not stop the work, they continued. In 1970, an attempt was made to use the "Gagara" to search for submarines in the Mediterranean (!). During this period, Be-12 aircraft were based at the Mersa Matruh airfield in Egypt. Repeated prompts from the aviation headquarters to submit a report on the work done were followed by obscure excuses about the complexity of mathematical processing of the data obtained, etc.

Ultimately, it turned out that with the help of equipment it is quite possible to distinguish sea from land and thus determine the moment of crossing the coastline. However, it was not difficult to notice it even without equipment with a forest of 260-340 kg. The first attempt to adapt the "thermal imager" to detect submarines ended in vain.

Thus, despite the desire to expand the arsenal of means intended for detecting submarines in a submerged position, it was really possible to rely only on sonobuoys and, to a lesser extent, on a magnetometer.

To search for the submarine in the surface position and under the retractable devices, a panoramic radar "Initiative ^" was used. It has several sweep scales and also performs the functions of a sighting system when bombing radio-locational-contrast targets. In this case, the aiming task is reduced to the imposition of an electronic crosshair on the target image with the help of sighting handles located not on the sighting-computing device.

Some of the devices that were included in the PPS-12 have already been used on other aircraft before, and this is true, but most of them have been significantly improved. So, the main difference between the automatic navigation device ANP-IB-I from its prototype is that it is connected with a Doppler measuring device for ground speed and drift angle, which made it possible to automatically enter data on the wind speed and direction. However, practical flights have shown that the DISS in flight over the sea, especially when it is roughly less than two points, often works unstable due to a weak signal and switches to the "Memory" mode.

To solve the problems of destruction, and in some cases, the placement of buoys along certain trajectories, an analog-type PVU-S sighting and computing device was intended.

Despite an attempt to combine search means and on-board equipment into a system, calculations and practice showed that the accuracy of the use of weapons against a submarine leaves much to be desired, since the probability of hitting it by a torpedo in the most favorable conditions did not exceed 15-20%.

The low efficiency of solving the problem of defeat was noticed even during the period of state tests. The Act included the requirement to supplement the SPARU with a device for simultaneous control of all 18 buoys of the set. Such a device was developed and installed on an aircraft, but this was little consolation.

Soon it was decided to modernize the search and sighting system of the Be-12 aircraft. But for some strange reason, it was limited only to the requirement to double the probability of hitting submarines with existing means.

The modernization that had begun gradually developed into the creation of a completely new search and targeting system, and in order to make it possible to solve a complex of new trajectory problems, a new targeting and computing device had to be installed.

Ultimately, the Beku radio-hydroacoustic system was installed on the Be-12 aircraft, the new APM-73S aviation magnetometer, the radar was modified, and it received the name Initiative-2BN, the Nera multichannel unified receiving device (MUPU) was installed, and the aiming and computing device "Narcissus" with a target analyzer. In addition to the RSL-NM buoys, ten passive directional buoys RSL-2, previously used in the Berkut system, began to be suspended from the aircraft.

The modified Be-12, which received the letter H after the number, did not enter the armament in April 1976 (their revision was carried out gradually).

The tactics of using Be-12N semiconductors in solving problems of searching for submarines did not undergo significant changes and remained the same. However, the crew's ability to establish the reliability of the contact increased slightly. For this purpose, they began to use passive directional buoys, although due to the high rotation frequency of the acoustic antenna, the submarine noise was not heard, but had to rely on a change in bearings,

At the same time, the scheme for solving the problem of defeat has undergone significant changes. Various options for its implementation have appeared. In the general case, the crew that found the submarine with non-directional buoys, when the direction of its movement was detected, set up an intercepting barrier from the RSL-2 (according to calculations, this required six to eight buoys). After, in the presence of information from two buoys, it was processed by the target analyzer, then in the form of two angular magnitudes it entered the digital computer.

The base measurement between the two buoys was made by the navigator by successively superimposing the radar crosshair on the transponder beacons of the RSL-2 buoys. At the same time, the coordinates of the buoys relative to the aircraft are stored in the memory of the CVU.

As experience was gained, some features of the Be-12 aircraft were revealed, regardless of the type of PPS installed on it. So, the roll control, with manual control of the aircraft, due to the lack of hydraulic boosters, required significant physical effort. The pilots, whose height was less than 170 cm, experienced difficulties on takeoff, and they had to put something under their backs. The takeoff with the right crosswind was especially difficult. Noises and vibrations caused a lot of inconvenience to the crew, which fell right into the setting of standards. I had to take measures aimed not at reducing these two factors on performance and fatigue. We remembered the so-called hydroacoustics headset. From him they borrowed ear pads made of polyethylene, filled with glycerin. A protective helmet was not put on a helmet (for pilots without a light filter for fear of catching on the handles for opening the upper cockpit hatch). A protective helmet on an airplane is absolutely necessary for the reason that it is not possible to get to the workplace, especially for pilots, without hooking your head on something. This was facilitated by the fact that the hatches in the plane had different heights.

The view from the cockpit, especially the navigator of the Be-12, is limited, and it is important that the glass is cleaned. In the first serial seven years, the pilot's lantern wipers were electrically driven, not very efficient. For quite a long time they could not, for various reasons, be replaced with more reliable ones, considering it a whim of the "military". But in one of the flights, the factory test pilot Yu. Kupriyanov made a dozen approaches before landing, because of the rain, however, not particularly intense. It is not known what affected the aircraft, but hydraulically operated windshield wipers were installed on the aircraft. However, in this case, too, the pilots, not relying too much on technology, opened the left window before landing, which was perhaps the most correct.

With the advent of the Be-12 amphibious aircraft, it became possible to set several world records on it. Only in 1968, the crews, whose commanders were honored test pilots of the USSR A.S. Sushko and E.M. Nikitin, set six records for range, speed and carrying capacity. World records were registered in the class of amphibious seaplanes with turboprop engines, and since no one has built such aircraft, the records, given the absence of rivals, can be considered more than arbitrary.

Anatoly Artemiev

The author of the article is a 1st class naval military pilot, retired colonel. Beginning in 1959, he was involved in the development of anti-submarine aviation, personally participated in the tests of anti-submarine systems, the work of commissions on new technology, developed fundamental documents and recommendations for the use of anti-submarine aircraft and helicopters.

The experience of the two past world wars and the attention paid to the improvement of submarines (submarines) in the post-war period indicate that they were and remain a formidable weapon capable of significantly influencing the outcome of the struggle, and not only in the maritime and ocean theaters of military operations. Of all the forces of the fleet, submarines are the most secretive, and they have not lost this tactical property until now.

Submarines - the fruit of the efforts of several generations of scientists and inventors - by the beginning of the 20th century. were built already in all developed countries that had fleets. The technical state of submarines of that period left much to be desired (they were half-blind, "diving", slow-moving), but the weapons they used - Whitehead's self-propelled mines (torpedoes) - turned out to be very effective against ships and vessels.

The appearance of submarines also intensified work on the creation of forces and means to combat them. The involvement of aviation for this became quite conscious: we took into account its ability to survey large areas of the sea in a short time, detect small targets, and relative invulnerability from submarines.

Studies of the possibility of using aviation to search for submarines were carried out in many countries, Russia did not stand aside. The first such flight was performed on the Black Sea on May 24, 1911 by Lieutenant V. V. Dybowski, instructor pilot of the Aviation Officer School of the Air Fleet Department in Sevastopol, with passenger Lieutenant Gelgar, on a two-seat Bleriot aircraft. The crew was tasked with determining the possibility of detecting a submerged boat. For observation and photographing of the sea surface, a special hatch was made in the floor of the passenger cabin.

The results obtained during the flight were encouraging: a periscope breaker was found, and the boat itself, according to the crew's report, was observed to a depth of about 30 feet (9 m). The flight was carried out at an altitude of 800 m.

Of course, on the basis of one experience, there was no reason to draw generalized conclusions, and even more so to recommend something specific, but the fact itself serves as evidence of interest in studying the capabilities of aircraft.

With the formation of a branch of naval pilots in the Black Sea fleet in 1912, the scale of experimental flights increased significantly, and again, primary attention was paid to studying the possibilities of detecting objects under water.

The Balts received a report from the Black Sea and conducted their own research. The conclusions, as expected, turned out to be completely disappointing - contact with the submarine was lost immediately after it was immersed at the periscope depth, which is explained in the first place

the worst, in comparison with the Black Sea, water transparency in the Baltic /

Nevertheless, on the basis of the results obtained, the conditions, methods and methods of increasing the efficiency of detecting submarines from an aircraft were determined. This conclusion can be drawn from the use of Russian naval aviation in the Black Sea. In connection with the specifics of combat operations in this naval theater, such tasks as the search for submarines, anti-submarine support for ships (convoys) during the passage by sea and in the landing area have acquired particular relevance.

Charles Whitmer (American instructor pilot of the Curtiss company, who worked in Russia), on his return to the United States, shared his impressions in print:

"During my three-month stay in Sevastopol, I saw airplanes going to sea every day ... This involved seven airplanes, which sequentially surveyed the fifty-mile strip (92.5 km) every day for observation of German boats."

The combat chronicle of our fleet and other documents left a description of individual episodes of the use of aviation against submarines.

On January 24, 1916, the pilot G.V. Kornilov, returning from reconnaissance, discovered a submarine approaching our destroyer. Her attack was averted.

In February of the same year, seaplanes operating from the Alexander-1 and Nikolay-1 aircraft struck the port of Zonguldak. During the ascent of the plane, which had completed the task, the aircraft "Alexander-1" attacked the German "U-7". In this difficult situation, two aircraft continued to monitor the submarine and marked its place. After that, the ships fired at her, and she did not appear again.

Of considerable interest is the organization of anti-submarine security of the landing force when it lands on the coast of Rize Bay (the coast of Turkey). An anti-submarine network was installed in the bay. On the approaches to it, two lines of duty ships were placed, over which seaplanes patrolled. Thus, while ensuring the landing of troops in the Rize Bay, for the first time, tactical interaction of anti-submarine defense ships and aviation was carried out.

During this period, the means to destroy submarines in a submerged position were also worked out in the Black Sea. Thus, on June 25, 1916, in Kruglaya Bay, tests were carried out on "variable-tightening TNT bombs" proposed by Lieutenant Boshnyak. It was found that the remote artillery tube used by the inventor burns quite well under water. The second bomb dropped exploded underwater.

* To characterize the transparency of water, the concept of "conditional transparency" is used, that is, the depth at which a white disc with a diameter of 300 mm becomes invisible. In the Baltic Sea, this corresponds to 12 m, in the Black Sea - 25 m.

Flying boat MBR-2

The experience gained by the Black Sea pilots was taken into account when developing the Instructions for the search and destruction of submarines, approved by the commander of the Black Sea Fleet on September 24, 1916

The entry of submarines and aircraft into the war has caused some confusion among military theorists. Not without irony, one can read the witty remark of Admiral A. V. Kolchak, referring to March 1917:

“… Submarines and airplanes spoil the whole position of the war… Now you have to shoot at something invisible, and such an invisible submarine will blow up the ship at the first opportunity… Some nasty thing is flying, which is almost impossible to hit. There is only concern from aviation, but there is no sense. "

The "position of war" by submarines and airplanes was seriously damaged. Quite a little time will pass, and "muck, which is almost impossible to get into", will enter into a mortal battle with the "invisible".

The British began to attract aviation to combat submarines in 1917, efforts were steadily increasing, and by 1918, against 372 German submarines, they had to attract 9,000 ships, 100 submarines, 5,000 armed ships, 2,500 aircraft and airships. These forces managed to sink 178 submarines, and the success of aviation turned out to be very modest - on its account only 10 submarines. At the same time, German submariners managed to sink 5,861 transport and 162 Allied ships.

Comparison of aviation efforts and the results achieved did not make it possible to draw a conclusion about its high efficiency. But such a conclusion would be clearly erroneous. Submarines for the use of torpedoes approached the attacked transports on the surface or under the periscope, which was also used for aiming. This unmasked them significantly.

The experience of the war showed that the convoys traveling with anti-submarine air escorts lost only two transports. The success was obvious.

In the period between the two world wars, both in our country and abroad, aviation search engines for submarines in a submerged position were not created. All attention was paid to the improvement of shipborne sound direction-finding equipment (with the help of such devices, the submarine was first discovered in 1916). Only in 1938, the British managed to develop a rather successful sonar "Asdik" (from the English Anti-Submarine, Detection Investigation Committee) for arming surface ships, ensuring the detection of submarines by the acoustic signals reflected from it.

The degree of the underwater threat from German submarines in World War II exceeded all expectations, and to combat them it was necessary to attract up to 5,500 ships, 20,000 small ships, about 1,600 British coast-based aircraft, 400 naval aircraft from escort aircraft carriers and 178 airships.

Aviation brilliantly coped with the tasks assigned to it, destroying 375 German submarines, which amounted to 48.1% of the total number of ships of this class sunk.

The success of aviation in the fight against submarines was by no means accidental, it is natural - it is the result of colossal efforts that led to the creation of aviation search equipment, the development of rational tactics of action, and the centralization of control of all anti-submarine forces.

The combat experience of British and American aviation in this regard is of undoubted interest.

Circumstances developed in such a way that until 1940 British aviation searched for submarines only during daylight hours and, with rare exceptions, on moonlit nights. In order to ensure tactical surprise, the pilots, when attacking detected submarines, practiced reducing the engine speed to idle and even turning them off. High-explosive bombs of various calibers were mainly used as means of destruction, and to increase accuracy they were dropped from low altitudes of the order of 30 and even 15 m, which in some cases led to the detonation of aircraft on their own bombs. Anti-submarine (depth) air bombs, which were in service with aviation, had a small explosive charge and poor ballistic characteristics. Only in 1942 did British aircraft enter service with new anti-submarine bombs equipped with torpex, an explosive that was more powerful than the previously used amatol.

The uncontrolled finding of German boats in the surface position at night and with poor visibility came to an end in 1940, when the ASU-1 radar detection stations began to be installed on aircraft - with a wavelength of 1.5 m, which greatly increased the search efficiency. But that was just the beginning.

The first aircraft radars did not provide the possibility of aiming during bombing, and to illuminate targets, in some cases, and to search for submarines at night, they tried to use luminous aircraft bombs, the luminous intensity of which reached two million candles. In June 1942, the British pilot Major Lee proposed to install a powerful searchlight of 60-80 million candles on the Wellington heavy bomber (called the Lee searchlight). In order to avoid blinding the crew, the searchlight was placed in the lower part of the aircraft, and when it was possible to reduce the size of its reflector, in the wing of the Catalin, Liberators, B-17, etc. a gun servant and used weapons. There are numerous examples of the successful use of radar and searchlight.

Aviation tactics in providing convoys were gradually improved. The security of convoys with aircraft on the lines of long-range and short-range anti-submarine protection by 1943, when improved sonars appeared on ships, was not considered expedient in all cases. We switched to more flexible tactics: when convoys were moving through areas where the probability of finding German submarines was low, the planes conducted a free search, and in the most dangerous ones they also carried out anti-submarine protection.

At the beginning of 1942, England and the United States organized a special analytical center, in which all data about enemy submarines were concentrated and operational information about them was issued to interested forces.

In April 1942, an English Hudson aircraft equipped with an ASV-1 radar crashed near Tunisia. The Germans got the radar, and in September they manufactured a receiver that would detect its radiation. The submarine was equipped with a receiver. This made it possible to advance in detection. And again, searchlights had to be used to find the submarine.

For their part, the Germans decided to actively fight aviation. They removed 88 and 105-mm guns from the submarine and instead installed 37 and 20-mm anti-aircraft guns and machine guns in the bow and stern. In response to this, the British equipped the aircraft with bow machine-gun installations, serviced by air gunners, who were obliged to conduct intensive fire on the attacked submarine on the combat course.

Restored MBR-2 in the Northern Fleet Museum

1943 was a turning point in the fight against German submarines. In March, some aircraft were equipped with the new 10cm ASV-3 radar. The receivers installed on German submarines did not detect these emissions. The aircraft also received a panoramic radar sight. For the protection of convoys, escort aircraft carriers began to be attracted on a large scale, more powerful 227-kg anti-submarine bombs and aviation radio-acoustic buoys were adopted by the aircraft. The latter were mainly used for secondary search: the plane marked the place of the submerged boat with a milestone (at night with a luminous landmark bomb), and then buoys were placed relative to it at the corners of a square with sides equal to 3-4 miles (5.5-7.3 km) ... Thereafter, the aircraft (groups of aircraft) patrolled the square on tacks of 20 miles (37 km) centered on the milestone. Receiving signals from the buoys and orienting themselves on them relative to the location and course of the submarine, the crew (crews) acted in accordance with the situation.

In July 1943, the 63rd patrol aviation squadron of the US Navy arrived to the aid of the British, whose aircraft (PBN-1) had new equipment for detecting submarines in a submerged position - aeromagnetometers MAD (Magnetic Anomaly Detector), developed by the American company Bell Telephone ...

The squadron was sent to patrol the Bay of Biscay, but its activities were unsuccessful - searches for boats did not lead to discoveries. Then they decided to use aircraft with magnetometers to block the Strait of Gibraltar in order to prevent the penetration of German submarines into the Mediterranean Sea. In the first two months, the planes managed to find and sink two German boats, following through the strait in a submerged position at low speed, using a passing current. After a while - another one. After that, for six months, German submariners did not attempt to penetrate the Mediterranean Sea.

The Allied anti-submarine forces in 1944 switched to more active use of aircraft - they began "to hunt for submarines constantly and achieved undoubted success. And again, their maneuverability turned out to be very useful. In a short time, they surveyed large areas of the seas (oceans), They fettered the submarine's initiative, deprived them of the opportunity to freely use their weapons.The aircraft became all-weather, received means of detection - radar stations, hydroacoustic buoys, magnetometers.

Onboard radars replaced lighting equipment, and in some cases were used in conjunction with them, complementing each other.

Hydroacoustic buoys made it possible to continue tracking the submarine, which had hidden from visual observation.

Magnetometric equipment proved to be effective in examining straits, narrows and for clarifying the location of a submarine found by other means or lying on the ground.

The means of destruction were also continuously improved - bombs, rockets, which provided the possibility of attack from significant distances, the first samples of anti-submarine torpedoes appeared.

The experience of anti-submarine operations acquired by our aviation during the Great Patriotic War is significantly inferior to the Anglo-American experience, which is explained by the more modest scale of the fight against submarines.

In the domestic naval aviation, the task of searching for and destroying submarines was assigned to reconnaissance aviation units and subunits. In total, it made 18,486 sorties.

An objective analysis carried out in the post-war period showed that without the participation of aviation, the protection of communications and anti-submarine support of convoys and ships would not have been so effective.

The reconnaissance aircraft of the western fleets entered the war armed with seaplanes MBR-2, GST, Che-2, KOR-1.

MBR-2 - naval close scout. Single-engine flying boat of mixed design. The M-17B motor is mounted on racks and equipped with a four-blade wooden pusher propeller. The latest modifications had a more powerful AM-34 engine. The aircraft's flight speed is up to 180 km / h, the flight duration is up to per hour, the bomb load is 200-400 kg, the crew is 3 people.

GST is a transport seaplane, sea long-range reconnaissance aircraft, an analogue of the PBY-1 flying boat made in the USA.

The license for the right to build the aircraft was purchased in the USA in 1937, but instead of the American Pratt Whitney and Wasp engines, they installed domestic M-87 and M-88 on the aircraft, which significantly worsened their characteristics. The production of aircraft under license began in 1930 and lasted for a year.

Aircraft speed - 180-190 km / h, flight duration - up to 15 hours, bomb load - 12 PLAB-100, crew - 6 people.

Che-2 (MDR-6) - sea long-range reconnaissance aircraft. Twin-engine all-metal flying boat. Designer I. V. Chetverikov. M-63 motors, flight speed - 190-210 km / h, flight duration - 4 hours 30 minutes, bomb load - 4 PLAB-100, crew - 4 people.

For the search for submarines, aircraft of other types were periodically involved, but the most suitable were PBN-1 flying boats and PBY-6A amphibious aircraft obtained from the USA under Lend-Lease. * They had the following data: flight speed - 180-200 km / h, flight duration - up to 24 hours, bomb load - 18 PLAB-100, crew - 7 people. The main search tool is a radar such as ASV-8 or Radar-6.

From the above data, it can be seen that PLAB-100 was the only bomb in service with naval aviation. She was supplied with a parachute, which provided the ability to drop at speeds up to 200 km / h. The ballistic qualities and the lethality of the bomb are low. By the beginning of the war, the air force warehouses of the operating fleets had 13,500 of these bombs, only 3,700 were spent during the war, and 1,100 were not intended. Considering that the attacked submarines were on the surface, high-explosive bombs of calibers 100 and 250 kg, rockets, torpedoes, and small arms and cannon armament of aircraft in these conditions brought a greater effect.

By the beginning of the war, the air forces of the Northern Fleet had only 49 MBR-2 and 7 GST in combat.

During the first 10 months of the war, German submarines did not impede the movement of convoys, although they were discovered more than once. Until 1944, they used maneuverable tactics, searched for surface ships and laid mines, then switched to positional tactics on the convoy routes.

The nature of the distribution of aviation search efforts across regions also changed.

The fight against submarines intensified somewhat at the final stage of the war. In only four months of 1945, the Northern Fleet aviation made 1,273 sorties to solve anti-submarine missions, and in total during the war - 4,299. As a result, 57 detections were recorded, that is, each took an average of 75 sorties. Of all the submarines detected, 42 were attacked, with 19 attacks carried out in February - March 1945.

Evaluating the results, the headquarters of the Northern Fleet Air Force believed that the share of aviation accounted for three sunk and three damaged submarines, ** however, even these more than modest results were in doubt. Post-war research confirmed (although not entirely convincingly) the sinking of two submarines (by Boston and Catalina aircraft) and the damage to the submarine by a B-25 aircraft.

* In 1944-1945 Naval aviation crews transferred 133 PBN-1 flying boats and 28 RVU-6A amphibious aircraft from the USA to our country.

** In total, 38 German submarines were sunk by the forces of the Northern Fleet.

Flying stock PBN-t

The Baltic Sea Air Force had 120 MBR-2.5 Che-2 in combat (the latter were transferred to the Northern Fleet Air Force in August 1941) and 6 KOR-1. They searched for submarines mainly in the Gulf of Finland and in the northern part of the Baltic Sea, as a rule, in pairs of aircraft, using visual aids. There were cases when up to 12 and even 18 aircraft flew to search for submarines, which surveyed significant areas almost simultaneously.

During the war, 1,579 sorties were made to search for submarines of the BF Air Force. Result - 4 damaged enemy boats.

It should be noted that in the Baltic the Germans used their submarines mainly against our boats in order to block them in the Gulf of Finland and prevent them from entering the Baltic Sea. In the area of \u200b\u200boperations of the Baltic Fleet, the Germans lost 16 submarines during the war.

The air force of the Black Sea Fleet had 139 MBR-2 and 11 GST in combat. Since 1944, other types of aircraft have been widely used to search for submarines.

At the beginning of the war, one Romanian submarine operated on the Black Sea, in May 1942 the 11th Italian flotilla of six small submarines arrived (displacement 45 tons, cruising range 90 miles), and by the end of the year - another 6 German submarines. During 1943, they made 30 military campaigns on the Batumi-Tuapse communications.

As a result of a well-organized anti-submarine surveillance system in the Black Sea, possibly for other reasons, the activity of German submarines was low.

The experience of using naval aviation in solving anti-submarine missions showed that they were not paramount for it, were rather episodic. The greatest tension in aviation (in terms of the number of sorties) falls on the Black Sea in the initial period of the war, in the Northern Fleet - in the final. No new ways to search for submarines and use means of destruction did not appear, there were no detections in the underwater position. The equipment of the aircraft, apart from the radars installed on PBN-1 flying boats and several Bostons, remained unchanged. However, it would be wrong to believe that the reason for the lag in the development of aviation anti-submarine weapons is due to an underestimation of their importance. The reason for this was the lack of specialists with the required qualifications, the backwardness of domestic radio electronics and technologies. But even in the presence of imperfect anti-submarine aircraft of the naval aviation, it was possible to solve the assigned tasks, forcing the German submariners to abandon active operations.

The search for submarines in wartime was facilitated by the fact that most of their voyage they had to be on the surface or go under the snorkel. * But after the war, the situation began to change relatively quickly. Large-scale experimental research and experimental work on the creation of naval nuclear power plants were launched. Upon completion of the latter in 1954, the US Navy received the first nuclear-powered submarine (PLA) with the pretentious name "Nautilus".

The Nautilus has demonstrated its long-term submerged capabilities twice, in 1954 and 1958, reaching the North Pole under the ice.

* Device for diesel engine operation under water.

But that was just the beginning. Submarine designers began to gradually create new weapons for them. Work on missiles was carried out by German specialists during the Second World War, but it was not completed. They continued in the USA, and in 1946 - 1947. the first experimental diesel submarines with guided missile aircraft "Luns" were submitted for testing. Subsequently, a more advanced guided missile "Regulus-1" was developed with a flight range of up to 800 km (provided with radar tracking along the flight path), and then "Regulus-2", which replaced it in 1958.

The projectile aircraft had a major drawback: they were launched only from the surface position, and it took at least 5-10 minutes to clarify the location and enter the data. This, of course, unmasked the PL.

For these reasons, as well as for financial reasons, further work on projectile aircraft was stopped, the main efforts were directed to the creation of missiles with an underwater launch. Their beginning dates back to 1955, when it was decided to start work on the Polaris program. It included the creation of a new class of missiles, submarines - missile carriers (SSBN), control facilities, etc.

It was assumed that SSBNs would be deployed near Soviet territory. Later, in connection with the appearance in the USSR of intercontinental ballistic missiles, the task was somewhat changed. To speed up the construction of the head SSBN, the Americans used the hull of the Skipjack submarine on the slipway. They cut it into two parts and built it into the middle of the 39 m long missile compartment. Simultaneously, the development of the Polaris A-1 solid-propellant rocket with a range of 2,200 km was going on. The missile had an inertial guidance system, a nuclear warhead, it could be launched from a submarine that followed at a depth of 30 m, at a speed of 3-4 knots (5.5-7.3 km / h). The work progressed successfully, and at the end of 1959 the first SSBN “D. Washington "went on combat patrols with 16 ballistic missiles on board. By the end of the year, the US Navy had 2 SSBNs and 11 SSBNs. The construction of diesel submarines was stopped.

It took only 15 post-war years to give the submarine completely new combat capabilities - the ability to act covertly and deliver nuclear strikes against cities, industrial facilities, and military bases located thousands of kilometers away.

The submarine threat turned into a nuclear one, which initiated work to create an anti-missile defense system, as well as forces capable of detecting missile submarines deployed at sea and on combat patrols awaiting command to use their formidable weapons.

Impact under water

The history of the development of anti-submarine aviation in our country least of all resembles a triumphal march. She had to go quite a long way from mistrust, through doubts to recognition. This became possible only after the means of search, defeat were developed, and most importantly, after the flight personnel were prepared for solving relatively new and, as it turned out, rather difficult tasks. It should be noted that the merits of the engineering and technical staff are completely undeniable, for they, in close contact with representatives of industry and research institutes, spent a lot of effort on improving anti-submarine weapons.

It so happened that almost at the same time, work was completed on the creation of means of search and destruction of submarines, and then they began to select aircraft for their placement.

The work on the creation of submarine search tools was preceded by a study of the experience of their use in other countries. However, even without this, it was possible to unambiguously conclude that acoustic and magnetometric search methods will receive the greatest development. The first was clearly preferred. This is due to the fact that acoustic waves propagate well in the aquatic environment, the source of which are the submarine propellers. Noises arising from the flow around its body and the operation of mechanisms and machines. As a result of the impact of all noise, the submarine's hydroacoustic field is formed - an area of \u200b\u200bwater space within which it can be detected.

In most cases, the noises of mechanisms and screws prevail over others. At high speeds, the noise generated by the propeller (s) increases. This can occur due to cavitation - the formation of air cavities on the front (suction) surface of the propeller blade. These air bubbles vibrate, making noise, and when they hit the high pressure area, they collapse with even more noise. In the absence of cavitation, noises of machines and mechanisms prevail, which affect the submarine body, causing its vibration.

The noise of submarines has many features, depending on their type, displacement, hull shape, number and location of propellers, etc. The noise of submarines of military construction and the first post-war years was significant. The contours of their hulls were designed to ensure good seaworthiness on the surface, just to the detriment of noise under water. This circumstance somewhat simplified the task of creating the first domestic means of detecting submarines using the hydroacoustic principle.

The acoustic field of a submarine is usually characterized by certain parameters: the noise spectrum, its general level, the direction of the noise and the reflective properties of the housing.

The spectrum of noise is analyzed with the help of special devices - spectrum analyzers, and in the range of audio frequencies (from 16 to 20,000 Hz) - and by ear. Knowledge of the noise spectrum makes it possible to classify the degree of reliability of a contact.

The total noise level is their total power over the entire frequency range.

The level of the hydroacoustic signal reflected from the submarine, referred to as "target strength", depends on the heading angle. So, when irradiated from the bow and stern, it is 10-20 decibels (1.5-2.5 times) lower than when irradiated from the side.

It is accepted that according to the method of obtaining information about an object, the search tools are divided into passive and active. The former make it possible to detect submarines by the distortions they introduce into the physical field of the Earth (for example, magnetic), by the fields generated by the interaction of the submarine with the environment (wake), and by the fields directly created by the submarine itself (acoustic).

Active search tools allow you to detect the submarine by the distortion that it introduces into the physical field created by the search tool itself (echo signal reflected by the submarine body).

Aviation hydroacoustic search devices for submarines include hydroacoustic stations and sonar buoys of various purposes and types: passive, active, non-directional, directional, etc.

Passive aviation non-directional hydroacoustic buoys were the simplest in design and were the first developed and mastered by our industry. In general, it is a float with electronic equipment, power supplies and an antenna device and an acoustic receiver-hydrophone connected to it by a cable, which is immersed in water. To reduce overload during landing, buoys are usually equipped with a parachute system.

In the area where the search is supposed to be carried out, the buoys are placed in a certain order, and if the submarine is at a distance less than the response radius of any buoy, then its acoustic receiver will detect noise, convert them into electrical signals and transmit it on the air using a transmitter and an antenna device ...

Passive non-directional buoys can only establish the presence of noise in the area of \u200b\u200bits response. In order to establish the belonging of the noises, they should be classified.

It is generally accepted that the beginning of work on the creation of the first domestic radio-acoustic buoys dates back to 1950, but this is not entirely true. Some data allow us to establish that by this time the first sample of such a device already existed. It was a passive non-directional buoy weighing 6.2 kg. Its design contained almost all of the above structural elements. The parachute had a diameter of 0.6 m. In flight, the buoy was dropped by the radio operator at the command of the crew commander (navigator), he first performed the following operations: pulled out the antenna about a meter long, closed the power supply circuit and prepared the parachute. At the moment of splashdown, the buoy's hydrophone was released from the nest, plunged to a depth of 6 m, and the transmitter began to emit radio signals modulated by environmental noise. They were received with an aircraft radio and listened to. They were classified.

To designate the buoy on the sea surface, a package with a coloring agent - fluorescein was tied to it (when combined with water, a clearly visible spot of bright green color was formed). For use at night, a cartridge with calcium carbide and a pyrotechnic composition was provided.

The buoys were not mass-produced and therefore little is known about them. At the end of the 40s. work was launched to create aviation buoys suitable for practical use. For this, the element base of the period was used when the KVN-49 TV was considered a miracle of technology. The work was completed successfully, and in 1953 the hydroacoustic system, which included a set of buoys and a receiving device, placed on a Be-6 flying boat, entered testing. Their first stage took 4 months and took place from July to November in the region of Poti. The Be-6 flew from Lake Paleostomi.

During the tests, the diesel submarine of project 613 (surface displacement of 1,050 tons), following under the periscope, and then at a depth of 50 m with a 5-6 nodal speed (9.25-11.2 km / h), was detected at distances of 1.5- 2.5 km. And it was a good result.

In January 1954, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy approved the test report. The submarine submarine detection system underwater received official recognition.

Not without reason, they decided to conduct the second stage of tests, but this time in the Barents Sea, and they received significantly better results - the detection range of submarines, at about the same speed, reached 5-6 km. It should be noted that the detection range of submarines by buoys is a variable value and varies widely from several hundred to several thousand meters, depending on hydrological conditions and many other factors.

The radio-hydroacoustic system was named "Baku" and in 1955 it was adopted by the naval aviation. The system included an aircraft automatic radio receiver SPARU-55 ("Pamir") and a set of 18 non-directional passive buoys RSL-N ("Iva"). The system has existed in aviation for almost 40 years, undergoing minor modifications. SPARU-55 is made according to the automatic radio compass scheme. It provides automatic sequential listening of all 18 buoys of the set, the transmitters of which used fixed frequencies in the range of 49.2 - 53.4 MHz with a tuning cycle of 110 s, and the aircraft output to their drive.

Buoys RSL-N "Iva" are the main sensors of information about the underwater situation. The buoy hydrophone (a thin-walled nickel tube about a meter long with coils with permanent magnets placed inside it) provides reception of underwater noise.

* Magnetostriction - a change in the size and shape of the body during magnetization. The inverse of the magnetostriction phenomenon is called the Villari effect.

For a long time, the industry could not solve the problem of increasing the cable length, citing technical obstacles. Then, without bothering with theoretical research, in the helicopter regiment of the Black Sea Fleet aviation, on their own, they lengthened the cable to 50 m, using an inexpensive television cable at that time.

The sound pressure deforms the pipe material. This led to a change with the sound frequencies of the magnetic flux of permanent magnets, and an electromotive force arose in their windings. Transducers of this type are called magnetostrictive. After amplification and conversion, the electrical vibrations of the audio frequency taken from the hydrophone are amplified and used to modulate the carrier frequency of the buoy transmitter, which emits them into the air.

The range of reception of buoy signals on an aircraft flying at an altitude of 500 m reached (in the first hours of operation) 60-70 km, and then decreased. The crew listened to the received signals and assessed the reliability of the contact.

The RSL-N radio-acoustic buoys, as well as the RSL-HM, RSL-HM-1, RSB-1 that followed, were equipped with an auto-launch device - the buoy transmitter was turned on only when a certain level of sound pressure on the hydrophone was reached. This mode is called duty in

in contrast to the continuous emission mode, when the transmitter entered into operation immediately after splashdown, regardless of the sound pressure. The latter mode is often called marker mode, since such buoys marked certain points on the water surface.

The choice of the position (sensitivity) of the self-launch was made depending on the state of the sea in the intended search area, the problem being solved, and was installed on the buoys in front of their suspension, which presented a certain inconvenience.

The significant weight of the RSL-N buoy, reaching 45 kg, was probably its main drawback; in addition, its length reached 2,000 mm, and the hydrophone was deepened by only 18 m ", a low rate of descent equal to 10 m / s led to significant wind drift.

The buoy's performance in standby mode reached one day, and in continuous mode - up to 8 hours. This was made possible by the powerful IT-6 dry battery weighing 12.2 kg. The buoy, like other products of a similar purpose, was supplied with a flooding mechanism with a clock mechanism from a spring alarm clock. It provided the ability to set the flooding time from 0.5 to 24 hours.

The first domestic serial aviation raliohydroacoustic RSL-N "Iva" RSL-HM "Chinara"

Buoy RGB-N with the side cover removed (1 antenna, 2 housing with control unit, 3 hydrophone with cable)

The cost of the RSL-N buoy was 800 rubles. in 1970 prices (color TV was sold at a price of 650 rubles). By 1978, the RSL-N buoys were considered obsolete and were used for training purposes.

They were replaced in 1961 by a new, small-sized buoy RSL-HM "Chinara" at that time. Not differing in purpose, equipment composition and principle from its predecessor, it had 3 times less weight and relatively new design solutions. The buoy's hydrophone was a tube assembled from 10 hollow piezoelectric elements connected in series and separated by rubber bushings.

In the new buoy, a system was provided for monitoring its operability after a splashdown (the transmitter was switched on for 4-5 minutes in continuous radiation mode), a water-filled (soaked) battery was used as a power source, which ensured the buoy's operability in standby mode for up to 6 hours, in continuous radiation mode - up to one hour. For the battery to come into working condition, it took 1.5-2 minutes after the buoy splashdown.

The disadvantages of the new buoy include the limited length of the hydrophone cable (20 m), the low power of the information transmitter in radiation (2 W, versus 7.5 for the RSL-N buoys), which led to a decrease in the range of its signals. The technical reliability of the buoys was found to be very low. Nevertheless, the Chinara RSL-HM buoys have been used by airplanes and helicopters, with the exception of the Il-38 and Tu-142, up to the present time (the cable of their hydrophones has been extended to 100 m).

Buoys "Chinara" were produced in Balti, H. Kakhovka and Vladivostok. Annual deliveries in the 70s reached 12,000-16,000 pieces. cost up to 1200 rubles. in 1970 prices

The next buoy entered service only 12 years after the "Chinara" and received the designation RSL-NM-1 ("Jeton"). It had significantly better detection range data under comparable conditions. This was achieved due to the fact that his hydrophone was designed to receive sound vibrations in the lower frequency range, which propagate in the aquatic environment with less loss (the hydrophones of the old buoys provided the best reception in the 5-10 kHz frequency range).

The control mode, which did not justify itself in practice, was excluded from the buoy scheme and a stepwise installation of the hydrophone deepening (20, 40 and 100 m) was introduced. The depth is installed on the buoy in front of its suspension. Thus, the listed three buoys were the first. They were designed to receive noise in the audio frequency range, equipped with an auto-start device and are fairly simple to prepare and maintain. Subsequently, this group was supplemented by more advanced buoys of the Berkut system, which will be discussed below.

The aircraft magnetometer was tested almost simultaneously with the Baku system. The magnetometric detection method essentially belongs to one of the branches of geophysics - magnetic prospecting, which aims to study the anomalies of the Earth's geomagnetic field. Submarines are also the source of such anomalies, which have a much shorter length. The hulls of modern submarines in most cases consist of ferromagnetic materials, as a result of which, under the influence of the earth's magnetic field, they are magnetized, that is, they acquire their own magnetic field. It is composed of constant and variable magnetization. Moreover, permanent magnetization is acquired mainly during construction. Inductive magnetization is not constant, it depends on the magnetic properties of the boat hull material, its course, etc.

It is believed that the hull of boats has an intensity of at least 0.0001 of the Earth's magnetic field and, by its presence, introduces anomalies (changes) in its distribution.

The positive quality of magnetometers lies in their independence from the state of the sea, hydrological conditions, and the flight speed of the aircraft on which it is located. However, magnetometers, as already noted, have shorter ranges compared to hydroacoustic devices, require certain conditions on the aircraft to ensure operability, the reliability of the magnetometric contact is low, and confirmation by other means is required.

The first Russian-made aircraft magnetometer APM-56 ("Chita") belonged to the fluxgate type and was a combination of two systems * - measuring and orienting. A magnetosensitive element (flux gate) made in the form of a permalloy core equipped with three windings was used as a sensor in the measuring channel. The primary winding was the main (measuring), the rest were auxiliary.

Structurally, the magnetometer consists of several blocks, the placement of which is subject to special requirements, in particular, to the block of sensitive elements, which should be located in places with the lowest magnetic field of the aircraft.

The capabilities of magnetometers were tested at every opportunity, but they did not cause much enthusiasm. The detection range of boats demagnetized according to the standards of the Navy with a displacement of 900-1,000 tons did not exceed 200-210 m. To expand the detection range, the aircraft had to fly at a minimum altitude.

In 1955-1956. the first samples of aviation radio-hydroacoustic and magnetometric means designed to search for submarines were developed and put into service in our country.

* All domestic magnetometers (APM-56, APM-60 and APM-73) are built according to similar functional block diagrams. They differed in principle due to the improvement of technology.

The weight of the radar station is 334 kg.

As noted above, the main elements of the PPS are combined using a digital computer TsVM-264, developed by a team led by V.I. Lanerdin. Is the machine designed on the basis of the "Plamya-VT" digital computer, created at the time by NII-1? ГКРЭ for the automation of solving the problems of aircraft navigation On the Il-38, the TsVM generates signals to the autopilot for flight control, calculates the places and elements of movement of the submarine according to data from buoys of various types, controls the radar crosshairs during auto-tracking of targets, keeps track of search and destruction means, opens cargo hatches before using the dropped means, calculates the probability of hitting a target with a given weapon, etc., TsVM-264 is a special unicast control machine with a binary number system. The speed of the machine, according to modern concepts, is not great and amounts to only 62 thousand operations of the addition type.

The reliability of individual elements of the TsVM-264 turned out to be low; a lot of time, effort and money was spent on fine-tuning and improving its performance without much success.

The weight of the machine with the frame reaches 450 kg.

On the signal board, located on the dashboard of the pilots, the digital computer gives out signals: "Gain the set altitude"; "The digital computer is faulty", etc.

The communication unit converts the information coming from the digital computer to the radar to a form that can be implemented by executive devices.

Rod of magnetometer magnetometer APM-60

An APM-60 aviation magnetometer was installed on Il-38 aircraft, which was subsequently replaced by an APM-73S. Its magnetically sensitive unit is located in the tail boom. It was assumed that the signals coming from the magnetometer would be input and processed into a digital computer. The idea was not realized, and the magnetometer has no electrical connections with the Berkut system. Depending on the task at hand, the Il-38 is used in search-and-strike, search or strike loading options by means of search and destruction of submarines. In the search option, it is possible to attach 216 RSL-1 buoys to the aircraft; in search and strike - 144 RSL-1, 10 RSL-2, 3 RSL-3, two torpedoes. There were options with a suspension of nuclear bombs and mines. The strike version of the aircraft, due to its tactical uselessness, was never taken into account.

Although the loading options provided for the suspension of anti-submarine bombs, everyone was well aware that they were not an effective means of destruction, and the main hopes were associated with the PLAT-2 (AT-2) torpedo being developed for the Il-38, which was supposed to replace the AT-1M torpedo. This is an acoustic homing in two planes electric torpedo. It had a number of design features that characterize it as the next stage in the development of domestic aviation anti-submarine weapons.

The torpedo is equipped with a multi-dome parachute system: first, two domes of 0.6 sq. m each, and then a brake parachute with an area of \u200b\u200b5.4 sq. m.

After splashing down and reaching a given depth of the initial search, the torpedo enters the search circle. AT-2 uses a programmed search along a cylindrical spiral with a variable step, decreasing in depth. The change in the pitch of the spiral in the first section of the trajectory occurs due to the automatic change in the trim of the torpedo from the initial value (11 degrees) to zero. This provides a complete view of the entire possible depth range. The search for the target is carried out at a speed of 23 knots (42.5 km / h).

Automatic recorder of the APM-60 magnetometer

The torpedo homing system worked in cycles, and up to 35% of the time was spent on the active mode. When the target was captured by the reflected echo signal, the homing system equipment switched to the active guidance mode. If the level of the noise received from the target exceeded the level of the hydroacoustic channel response in the receive mode, the cyclic operation of the homing system was interrupted and it was guided to the target by the passive channel of the system.

If the target is lost after a certain time, depending on the guidance mode and the target heading angle, the equipment switches to the re-search mode in the active-passive mode.

The length of the AT-2 torpedo is 5200 mm, the diameter is 534 mm, the weight is 1030 kg, the stroke depth is up to 400 m.

With almost a year's lag on March 10, 1963, the Berkut PPS in an incomplete configuration (without a digital computer) was installed on the aircraft, the development of individual blocks continued on the Il-18. At this stage, 147 flights were carried out with 369 hours of flight time on the Il-38 alone. Such a large plaque indicates that it took a lot of effort and a lot of nerves. The crew of Major A.P. Sharapov from 33 Center provided substantial assistance.

After the installation of the digital computer on the aircraft, the tests continued in accordance with the order of the commander-in-chief of the Air Force, the chairman of the GKAT and the chairman of the GKRE of September 15, 1964. They started on October 2 and finished on November 28. 19 flights were made with a flight time of 61 hours 40 minutes. They showed that the PPS is far from the state that ensures the implementation of the declared technical and tactical flight characteristics. Almost in every flight, there were failures of the digital computer, which united the main elements of the "Berkut" system.

Drop control console

The sonar test range developed by the officers of the 33 Center V.V. Achkasov, O.K. Denisenko and Magadeev, which is a simulator that simulates the operation of non-directional and directional buoys, which ensures the development of the task of hitting a target on a land range using bombs ... The creators of the device, which saved a lot of time and money, were encouraged "royally" by giving out three hundred rubles each, as well as those who joined them.

State joint tests of the Il-38 aircraft were carried out in accordance with the instructions of the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR L.V. Smirnov dated February 8, 1965 and by a joint decision of the Air Force, MAP and MRP, adopted on March 3, 1965.

They began on July 6 and ended on December 15, 1965. In the course of them, 87 flights were made with a flight time of 348 hours 43 minutes, including the fine-tuning of the Berkut system and the testing of the APM-60 magnetometer.

At this stage, the plane was handed over with two hundred comments. The Air Force Research Institute brigade, responsible for testing, was headed by engineer-colonel O. A. Voronenko, leading engineer on the anti-submarine complex, engineer-lieutenant colonel A. K. Kiryukhin.

The flights were performed by the leading pilots: senior test pilot of the 3rd Directorate of the 8th State Scientific Research Institute of the Air Force, Colonel S. M. Sukhinin, senior test pilot of the same Directorate, engineer-lieutenant colonel Kuzmenko; from OKB-240 GKAT leading test pilot V.K.Kokkinaki; test pilot A. N, Tyuryumin.

Of course, the results of training the PPS were least of all dependent on the pilots, which cannot be said about the engineers and test navigators Lieutenant Colonels Moskalenko, Melekhin, Voronov, Major Litsman, who were the main burden.

In the Act, according to the test results, despite the considerable time spent, quite a few significant shortcomings were noted. Only the list No. 1 (to be eliminated before the start of the aircraft operation) included 96 items.

According to the test data, the operating time of the Berkut PTS was 6 hours. A high level of noise in the cockpit was noted, which significantly exceeded the established OTT-58. The fact is quite unpleasant for an aircraft with a long flight duration, and most likely this was a consequence of the transfer of the wing, and, consequently, of the engines forward by 3 m.Moreover, at the pilot's workplaces, the noise level was significantly lower than that of the operators.