Government "HF communication" during the Great Patriotic War

P.N. Voronin

Government communication plays an important role in the management of the state, its Armed Forces, in social, political and economic life. Its foundation was laid in 1918, when the Soviet Government moved to Moscow. Initially, a manual switch for 25 numbers was installed in Moscow, then it was expanded and subsequently replaced with an automatic telephone exchange.

Long-distance government communication (in memoirs and works of art it is called "high-frequency communication") was organized in the 30s as an operational communication of the state security bodies. It ensured a certain secrecy of the negotiations, and therefore the heads of the highest governing bodies of the state and the Armed Forces also became its subscribers. In May 1941, by the order of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, this connection was defined as "Government high-frequency communication" and the corresponding "Regulation" was approved. In accordance with the accepted terminology, "HF communication" can be attributed to one of the secondary EASC networks and must meet additional requirements for the protection of transmitted information, reliability and survivability. However, it was not possible to fully implement these requirements before the start of the Great Patriotic War. As a means of command and control of the Armed Forces in a combat situation, high-frequency communication was unprepared.

The complication of the situation at the beginning of 1941 was felt by the increasing number of assignments for organizing high-frequency communications for large formations and formations of the Red Army in the border zone. The night of June 21-22 caught me doing one of these tasks. At about 4 o'clock in the morning, a technician on duty from Brest called and said that the Germans had begun shelling the city. The evacuation began. What to do with the equipment of the HF station? It was instructed to contact the local leadership and act on their instructions, but under all conditions, dismantle and remove the classified equipment. Then such calls came from Bialystok, Grodno and other cities along the western border. Thus began the war, which immediately posed a number of urgent tasks.

In view of the possible bombing of Moscow by the enemy, it was necessary to urgently move the Moscow HF station to a protected room. A room was allocated on the Kirovskaya metro platform. The station was closed to passengers. Installation was carried out on its own. The work was complicated by the fact that it was necessary to transfer the operating equipment without interrupting the work of the HF station. We did not have any backup equipment.

Similar work was carried out by the People's Commissariat of Communications (NK). The telegraph equipment, the intercity station was moved to protected premises. The work was headed by I.S.Ravich (at that time the head of the Central Directorate of Main Communications). We worked closely with him. The channels required for HF communication were to be received only from protected NK communication nodes.

The general unpreparedness of the means of communication for war immediately affected. The entire network of the country was based on air lines, extremely exposed to the influence of climatic conditions, and with the deployment of hostilities and destruction by the enemy both by air bombing and by sabotage groups. The Germans even used special bombs "with hooks" to destroy multi-wire communication lines. Falling, such a bomb hooked on the wires and exploded, destroying the entire bundle of wires at once.

There were also serious shortcomings in the construction of the used long-distance communication network. It was created on a strictly radial principle. There were no ring communication lines and bypass routes, no reserve communication centers were prepared, protected from enemy bombing, even the main long-distance routes to Moscow were not ringed. In case of destruction of one of them, it was impossible to switch the communication lines to another direction. NK Communications made a decision to urgently build in September 1941 a bypass ring communication line around Moscow along the Lyubertsy - Khimki - Pushkino - Chertanovo route. In 1941 it was a ring about 20 km away from Moscow. NK Communications carried out other work to improve the reliability of the long-distance network.

The task was set to provide high-frequency communication with the fronts, and after the battle of Moscow - with the armies. A number of questions immediately arose and, first of all, who would build communication lines and operate them, how to provide front-line HF stations with communication equipment - compaction equipment, switches, batteries, classified communication equipment (ZAS) and other equipment adapted to work in the field ...

The first question was resolved quickly. The State Defense Committee (GKO) ordered the NK of Communications and the NK of Defense to build and maintain government communications lines. But experience has shown that this was not the best solution. Communications NK had overseers to service the lines - one for tens of kilometers. With massive damage to air lines as a result of hostilities, air bombing and destruction by enemy sabotage groups, it was physically impossible to quickly eliminate the damage and ensure the uninterrupted operation of communications.

The NK defense signalmen were busy maintaining the lines of command and control and also could not focus on the lines of Government communications. As a result, the Government communication at some moments worked unstable, which led to fair complaints from subscribers. After each complaint, analysis began, the reasons were clarified, and recriminations began. Who's guilty? The matter reached the top leadership of the NKVD, NK communications and NK defense. A cardinal solution to this issue was needed.

In the NKVD government high-frequency communications department, it was decided to create a line-operational service, for which to form 10 line-operational companies, then another 35. Government communications began to work more steadily. But already during the battle of Moscow, when our troops began to attack and the headquarters of the fronts and armies moved forward, difficulties arose with the construction of communication lines.

This issue became especially acute in 1942, when the Germans approached the Volga and began to surround Stalingrad. I remember one of the autumn evenings in 1942. The Germans were furiously rushing to the city. The battles were fought on the near approaches. The front headquarters was located in a shelter on the right bank of the Volga. Communication with the front was interrupted due to the intensified bombing of communication lines. The line units of the Government Liaison made heroic efforts to restore the lines, but the enemy bombed, and the connection was again disrupted. Bypass lines were also violated. At this time, J.V. Stalin needed a connection with the Stalingrad Front. A. N. Poskrebyshev, Stalin's assistant, called me and asked what to report to him - when there would be a connection. I answered - in 2 hours (in the hope that during this time it will be possible to restore the line). I contacted our unit and received a reply that the bombing had intensified. He gave the command to make a "temporary hut" - to lay the PTF-7 field cable on the ground. Poskrebyshev called again after 2 hours. I informed him that it would take another 40 minutes. After 40 minutes Poskrebyshev offered to personally report to Stalin when there would be a connection. But at this time the line was restored. Stalin spoke with the headquarters, and a personal report was not required. Soon, the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Beria and the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, the People's Commissar of Communications IT Peresypkin, were summoned to Stalin. Stalin expressed great displeasure that there was no stable connection with Stalingrad and recalled that as early as 1918 he had a reliable connection with Lenin while on the Tsaritsyn front.

It was instructed to submit proposals providing for the responsibility of one body for the unconditional reliability of the communication. Such proposals have been developed. The GKO decree was issued on January 30, 1943. The government communications troops were created, whose task was to ensure the construction, maintenance and military protection of the government communications lines from the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to the fronts and armies. Other lines running through the territory of the country to the republics, territories and regions, used for government communications, remained in the service of NK communications.

The NKVD established the Office of the Government Communications Troops. It was headed by P.F.Uglovsky, who had previously been the chief of communications for the border troops. The head of the line service in the Department of Government Communications K. A. Aleksandrov, a major line specialist, became his deputy. At the fronts, Departments of Government Communications were created, which were subordinate to the units of the troops of Government Communications - separate regiments, battalions, companies. It seems somewhat strange the decision to create in the NKVD two units in charge of Government communications - the Department and the Directorate of Troops. However, this was dictated by the specifics of the work of the state security agencies: there were operational units and troops performing specific military tasks at the direction of operational agencies.

Like this structure, the NKVD had an operational body - the Department of Government Communications, which was in charge of the organization of communications, its development, technical equipment, station service, issues of maintaining secrecy - and the troops that built communication lines, ensured their uninterrupted operation and were guarded by paired outfits and secret ambushes in vulnerable places, excluding the possibility of connecting to the lines for eavesdropping, suppressed possible sabotage.

The department and the Directorate of Troops worked in close contact throughout the war, and there were no misunderstandings in their relationship. They merged in 1959; the structure of the Government Communications has received its logical conclusion. The agencies and troops were able to comprehensively carry out the tasks of organizing and maintaining communications in difficult conditions of a combat situation.

Communication was organized along "axes" and directions. The center line was pulled to the front headquarters. As a rule, they tried to build two center lines along different routes, a direction was laid to the armies - one communication line. Two circuits were suspended from it: one was sealed by HF equipment, and the other, a service one, was intended for communication with service posts.

In the army, during the construction of communication lines, we often contacted the signalmen of the NK defense. They pulled one line, which was used for compaction, and the "midpoint" was handed over to the army signalmen for telegraph communication on the Baudot system. HF communications were organized at the main command post (CP), reserve (ZKP) and forward (PKP) points. When the front commander left for the troops, he was accompanied by an officer of the Government Liaison with the ZAS equipment. HF communications were organized at the location of the commander, taking into account the available army communication lines or NK communication lines.

The government communications troops received their baptism of fire in the battle on the Oryol-Kursk Bulge, where five fronts operated simultaneously and several dozen HF stations were deployed. Signalers successfully coped with the assigned tasks, ensuring uninterrupted communication of the Headquarters with all fronts, armies and two representatives of the Headquarters -G. K. Zhukov and A. M. Vasilevsky, who had their own HF stations.

After the Orel-Kursk battle, the troops began a rapid offensive, liberating our territories from the German invaders. The speed of advance of combined arms armies reached 10-15 km per day, and tank armies - up to 20-30 km. At such a rate, the troops did not have time to build permanent air lines. It was necessary to arm them with the so-called cable-pole lines, which were deployed during the rapid advance of the troops as temporary and were subsequently replaced by permanent ones if it was required to maintain this direction. This is how the line service was created.

The issues of technical equipment of front-line and army HF communication stations were also resolved. In the Government Communications, for the organization of high-frequency channels, the multiplexing system in the 10-40 kHz spectrum of the SMT-34 type adopted at that time on the long-distance NK communications network was used. It was purely stationary equipment. The racks were 2.5 m high and weighed more than 400 kg. On a car, the rack could be transported by laying it on its side. She could not stand any shaking. Often, after transportation, it was necessary to restore the installation for days. There were also no switches, batteries, blocking stations and other equipment adapted to the field conditions. Everything had to be created anew.

The only base for the production of long-distance communications equipment at that time was a workshop at the Krasnaya Zarya plant in Leningrad. But by the end of 1941, Leningrad was in a blockade. Emergency measures were taken to evacuate this shop to Ufa, where plant No. 697 for the production of long-distance communication equipment and a research institute were established.

Thanks to the hard work of teams led by prominent specialists A, E. Pleshakov and M.N. Vostokov, the SMT-42 equipment was created (in the 10-40 kHz spectrum), and then the SMT-44 (field versions of the SMT-34 equipment; height - 60 cm, weight 50 kg). It was convenient for the rapid deployment and dismantling of HF stations, and withstood shaking during transportation. The NHFT equipment was also developed in the spectrum up to 10 kHz and the fourth channel was added to the CMT equipment in the spectrum over 40 kHz, switches and ZAS equipment were created in field performance. For the creation of this complex, the authors were awarded the State Prize. Government communications received a complete set of communications equipment in field performance, which made it possible to quickly resolve issues of organizing high-frequency communications.

An attempt was made to reserve wire communication with the fronts by radio communication. For radio communication at that time, only the KB band could be used. The RAF and PAT stations produced by the industry were taken. But they did not find wide application. The ZAS equipment used on radio channels made high demands on the channel quality, which was difficult to achieve on HF lines. In addition, the subscribers, who were warned that they were provided with communication by radio, often refused to speak. I remember such a case. After the end of the war, a peace conference was held in Paris. The Soviet delegation was headed by VM Molotov. We organized a wire connection to Berlin via our own communication lines, and from Berlin to Paris the line was provided by the Americans. While we were having open conversations, the connection worked perfectly, as soon as the ZAS was turned on, the connection was terminated. We also provided for radio reservation, using stationary radio communications NK communications. But Molotov refused to speak on the radio, saying that he had to recognize the subscriber with whom he was speaking by his voice. With the ZAS equipment that was used, this was difficult to achieve. I had to quarrel with the Americans and achieve stable operation of wire communication.

The characteristics of the activities of the Government Communications during the Great Patriotic War will not be complete, if you do not dwell on some of the most significant operations and measures.

When at the end of 1941 Leningrad was blockaded by the Germans, the question of high-frequency communication with the Leningrad front and the city arose. NK Communications organized radio communications. We could not use this connection due to the lack of appropriate ZAS equipment. We needed a wire line. The communications NK and the Defense NK decided to urgently lay a cable in the only possible direction - along the bottom of Lake Ladoga. The laying was carried out already under enemy fire. As a result, a wire connection was organized via "air" with Leningrad through Vologda to Tikhvin, then by cable to Vsevolozhskaya, then again by air to Leningrad. The headquarters had a stable high-frequency connection with Leningrad throughout the war.

By the summer of 1942, the Germans had recovered from the defeat near Moscow, an offensive began in the southern direction. The Voronezh Front was created. I flew with a group of employees to Povorino, where the headquarters of the Voronezh front was to move. Soon the first deputy commissar of communications A. A. Konyukhov arrived there. We launched work on assembling nodes and organizing communications. The Germans bombed Povorino every day. During the bombing, we hid in a nearby ravine, and then continued work again. But one day, returning from hiding, we saw the dying debris of the buildings where we placed our nodes. All equipment was also lost. There were "claws" and a telephone set. We climbed onto the lead-in post with preserved wires. A. A. Konyukhov and I reported to our leaders about the incident. But by this time the situation had changed and HF communications were deployed in the village of Otradnoye, where the front headquarters soon moved. Soon I was ordered to urgently leave for Stalingrad.

A very difficult situation developed in Stalingrad. All the main lines of communication between Moscow and Stalingrad went along the right bank of the Volga. After the Germans came ashore above Stalingrad, in the town of Rynok, and below Stalingrad, in the Krasnoarmeisk region, the city was surrounded. On August 23, 1943, the Germans launched a massive raid. The whole city was on fire. Under the most difficult conditions, the NK communications signalmen took all the equipment of the intercity station to the left bank and mounted a backup unit in the town of Kapustin Yar, with access to Astrakhan and Saratov. There are no active communication lines left in Stalingrad. The headquarters of the Stalingrad Front was on the right bank. Communication with him could only be organized from the left bank. The HF station of Stalingrad was also moved to the left bank in the town of Krasnaya Sloboda. Together with IV Klokov, the responsible representative of the NK communications, we gave instructions to pull the line across the Volga.

First of all, we checked whether it was possible to use the existing cable passage in the Market area. It was difficult to drive up to the cable booth - the Germans controlled all approaches. And yet we crawled up to her on our bellies and checked the serviceability of the cable. It worked, but the Germans answered at the other end. It was impossible to use this cable for our purposes. There was only one way out - to lay a new cable crossing over the Volga. We didn't have a river cable. We decided to put the PTF-7 field cable, which was not suitable for working under water (it was blocked after 1-2 days). We called Moscow to urgently send a river cable.

The laying had to be carried out under continuous mortar fire. The oil barges sailing along the river caused great harm. Pierced by the shells, they floated with the current, gradually sinking into the water, and cut our cables. Every day I had to put more and more bunches. The HF communications switch was installed in the dugout where the front command was located. LF communication was transmitted to this switch from the HF station located on the left bank.

Finally, the river cable arrived. The drum weighed over a ton. No suitable boat was found. We made a special raft. At night they began laying, but the Germans spotted us and smashed the raft with mortar fire. I had to start all over again. Finally the cable was laid. It worked reliably before freezing. Later, in addition to it, an air line was laid on the ice. The pillars were frozen into ice.

In February, the Germans were defeated. Communication with Stalingrad began to work according to the pre-war scheme.

Great difficulties were encountered in organizing the Governmental Communications at the Tehran Conference of the three Allied Powers. In peacetime, the Soviet Union did not have a wire connection with Tehran. It was necessary to organize it. The task was complicated by the fact that Stalin, as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, needed communication not only with Moscow, but also with all fronts and armies.

I went with a group of specialists to Tehran two months before the meeting to study the situation, make a decision and organize the necessary work on the installation of the HF station and the preparation of communication lines. After reviewing the situation, I realized that the only line that can solve the problem is the Ashgabat-Kzyl-Aravat-Astara-Baku air communication line, laid along the coast of the Caspian Sea. By agreement with Iran, this line was built by the NK of communication as a bypass for communication with the Caucasus, since the Germans broke through to the Caucasus and could cut the lines going to Baku, the Transcaucasian Front, Georgia, Armenia. It was necessary to find a way out of Tehran to a bypass line. The Iranian communication lines in this direction were in a disgusting state: they walked through the rice fields and were inaccessible for service. The poles were askew, the insulators on many of the poles were missing, the wires were hanging on hooks or were simply nailed to the poles.

The so-called Indo-European communication line through Iran has been more or less preserved. They decided to use it. At one time, it was built by the British on metal pillars to link London with India. The line for its intended purpose was not used and was under the jurisdiction of Iranian signalmen. It was decided to place the Soviet delegation in the building of the USSR embassy, \u200b\u200band it was also planned to locate an HF station there. The indicated communication line was brought to the embassy. At the points of Sari and Astara, we made transfers on our line. Now from Tehran there were two exits to Baku through Astara and to Ashgabat-Tashkent through Kzyl-Aravat (Turkmenistan). Thus, although with great difficulties, it was possible to ensure stable HF communication for the entire duration of the Tehran conference.

The rapid offensive of our troops in 1943-1945. demanded full stress in the work of the organs and troops of the government communications. A characteristic feature of the strategic offensive was the continuous expansion of its territory, which gradually covered a zone of up to 2000 km. The depth of attacks on the enemy reached 600-700 km. The headquarters of the fronts moved up to three times in one operation, and the headquarters of the armies up to eight. The closest interaction was established between the bodies and troops of the Government communications and the signalmen of the NK communications and NK defense. By joint efforts, reconnaissance of the surviving permanent communication lines was carried out. The issues of joint construction and restoration of lines were carefully coordinated. During the summer-autumn operations of 1943, the Government communications troops built 4041 km of new permanent lines, restored 5612 km of lines, suspended 32,836 km of wires, and built 4071 km of pole lines. The divisions and troops were gaining experience, they were already capable of solving complex problems of organizing high-frequency communications in any situation.

If we evaluate the completed tasks, we should focus on the proposed relocations of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command from Moscow to other cities. As you know, the Headquarters was in Moscow throughout the war, and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief went to the front only once - to the Rzhev region. HF communication with him was maintained by mobile means. However, the decision to move the Headquarters was made twice - in 1941 and 1944. In 1941, when the Germans came close to Moscow and the front line was 20-30 km away, the leadership of the General Staff turned to Stalin with a proposal to move the Headquarters inland. According to the provisions on the conduct of military operations, the Supreme Command should be located from the front line at a distance of 200-300 km. The situation demanded to determine the point where the rate could be moved.

As Marshal I. T. Peresypkin told me, Stalin approached the map and said: "When Ivan the Terrible took Kazan, his rate was in Arzamas, and we will stop at this city." With a group of specialists, I went to Arzamas and began to organize work on the installation of the HF station. For Stalin, a two-story house was chosen, the first floor of which was given to the HF station. During the installation, it was possible to go to the fronts, bypassing Moscow. However, only the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal BM Shaposhnikov, arrived in Arzamas and soon left back to Moscow. Instead of Arzamas, they began to prepare premises in Gorky for the headquarters and the Government. But he was given a retreat. The work stopped and we returned to Moscow.

The second time the decision to relocate the Headquarters was made in 1944, after the successful Bagration operation and the liberation of Minsk. Marshal I. T. Peresypkin informed me about this and offered to go to Minsk. We left together with K. A. Aleksandrov. On the way, discussing the situation in Minsk, we came to the conclusion that it was necessary to strengthen the connection between Minsk and Moscow. In this direction, only one circuit operated, sealed by three-channel equipment. It was decided to suspend three more, of which two - by the forces of the NK communications and NK defense and one - by the Government communications forces. Communication centers were deployed in Minsk and extensive work was carried out to build bypass lines around the city. After a while, the lights were released again. The headquarters remained in Moscow.

Attaching special importance to the organization of government communications with the fronts and armies, we should not forget about the work of the entire communications network with the republics, territories and regions, especially since a significant number of new HF stations were opened in the rear - at factories of defense industries that manufacture weapons for the army, in the places where reserve armies are formed - and a number of others related to the needs of the front. An important role in the successful work of the Government Communications was played by the state of the NK communications nationwide network. Sometimes additional costs of NDT communications were required. And I must say that we met with full understanding of the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Communications, the People's Commissar I. T. Peresypkin, as well as his deputies I. S. Ravich and I. V. Klokov, who closely interacted with us.

On the eve of Victory Day in 1965, the newspaper Pravda wrote: "Special signal troops operated successfully on the fronts of the Patriotic War. In difficult conditions of a combat situation, the signalmen of the state security agencies ensured a stable closed communication between the leaders of the Party and the Government, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command with the fronts and armies, skillfully suppressed attempts of enemy saboteurs to disrupt communications. "

Marshal of the Soviet Union I.S.Konev in his memoirs spoke of HF communication in the following way: “I must say that this HF communication, as they say, was sent to us by God. It helped us so much, was so stable in the most difficult conditions that to pay tribute to our equipment and our signalmen, who specially provided this HF communication and in any situation literally on the heels of accompanying all those who were supposed to use this communication during the movement. "

The organs and troops of the Government Communications did an excellent job with the tasks assigned to them, making a great contribution to the Victory over Nazi Germany.

For 12 years, Petr Nikolayevich Voronin, who served as deputy chairman of the Interdepartmental Coordination Council for the creation of the country's Unified Automated Communication Network, during the Great Patriotic War, ensured communication between the Supreme Command Headquarters and the headquarters of the fronts and armies. He was engaged in the construction of backup nodes and communication lines in Moscow and around the capital. He took an active part in organizing communications during the days of the defense of Moscow, during the Battle of Stalingrad, lifting the blockade of Leningrad, conducting Orel-Kursk, Berlin and other operations. Provided communication for the Supreme Commander-in-Chief during the Tehran and Potsdam Conferences. He was awarded the Order of the October Revolution, Orders of the Patriotic War I and II degrees, three Orders of the Red Banner, three Orders of the Red Banner of Labor, two Orders of the Red Star, other military and labor orders and medals.

To transfer information between protections and automatics at the ends of the high-voltage line, a channel is used, created for high-frequency currents according to the “phase-to-earth” connection scheme.

As part of the path, one phase of the operating overhead line is included, which is connected to the ground through the coupling capacitors at the substations to create a closed loop for HF currents.

Most often, two remote phases "A" and "C" are used on the line for transmission of commands of frequency No. 1 through one of them from the substation, and reception on frequency No. 2 through the second.

The structure and purpose of the HF communication channel... Transmitters and receivers of high frequency signals are installed at each substation. In this case, the modern equipment of HF transceivers is made on the microprocessor base of ETL640 v.03.32 terminals by ABB.

For processing signals at each frequency, its own transceiver is manufactured. Therefore, one substation requires 2 sets of terminals configured to simultaneously receive and transmit signals on different phases of the overhead line.

The connection of the HF transceiver to the overhead line is handled by special equipment that separates high voltage from low-current equipment and creates a highway for transmitting HF signals. It is completed with:

High voltage coupling capacitor (CS);
- connection filter (FP);
- high-frequency minelayer (VZ);
- HF cable.

The purpose of the high-voltage coupling capacitor is to reliably isolate from the ground the power transported along the overhead line with an industrial frequency and pass high-frequency currents through itself.

In the photograph of the line under consideration, there are 3 capacitors with phase converters in each phase. They are used to communicate with far-end equipment to:

1. Transmission of commands RZ and PA;
2. Reception of commands RZ and PA;
3. Work of HF equipment of communication service.

To separate the high-frequency signal from the high-voltage equipment of the substation, a high-frequency trap is mounted in the phase wire of the high-voltage overhead line. which limits the amount of RF signal loss through parallel circuits.

Power-frequency currents pass well through it and high-frequency currents are not passed. The VZ consists of a reactor (power coil), passing the operating current of the line, and adjustment elements connected in parallel with the reactor.

To match the parameters of the input impedances of the HF cable and line, a connection filter is used, which is performed by a model of an air transformer with taps from the windings, which allows making the necessary adjustments. The RF cable connects the filter connection to the transceiver.

High frequency transceivers (ETL640), purpose... Transceivers of ETL640 type (PRM / PRD) are designed to transmit and receive RF signals in the form of commands generated by relay protection (RP) and emergency control equipment (PA) to the opposite end of the overhead line.

HF channel serviceability check... Complex equipment of the HF transmission path is located at distances of hundreds of kilometers and requires monitoring and maintaining its integrity. ETL640 transceivers at the ends of the overhead line constantly in normal operation exchange (transmit / receive) signals of the control frequency.

When the signal decreases in magnitude or changes in its frequency beyond the permissible limits, a malfunction alarm is triggered. After the restoration of operability, the transceiver automatically returns to normal operation.

Signal exchange... Signals are transmitted and received at dedicated frequencies, for example:

Complex on phase “A”: Тх: 470 + 4 kHz, Rx: 474 + 4 kHz;
- complex on phase “C”: Тх: 502 + 4 kHz, Rx: 506 + 4 kHz.

ETL640 equipment is designed for round-the-clock continuous operation in heated substations.

Reception and transmission of commands... Terminals No. 1 and No. 2 of ETL640 complexes receive and transmit 16 commands from RZ and PA.

ETL640 Transceiver Commands... Typical commands of the transceiver of any ETL640 complex can be as follows:

1. Disconnection of 3 phases of the 330 kV overhead line from the far end of the overhead line without control, with the prohibition of TAPV and start-up from the breaker failure or ZNR complex No.… REL-670;

2. Disconnection of 3 phases of the 330 kV overhead line from the far end of the overhead line with control by measuring devices Z3 DZ and the 3rd stage of NTZNP complex No.… REL670 protection without prohibiting TAPV and starting from the factor of 3-phase shutdown of complex No.… REL protections;

3. Teleacceleration of DZ with action on one or 3-phase shutdown of 330 kV overhead line from the far end of the overhead line, with control of parameters of stage Z3 DZ of complex No.… protection REL670 with OAPV / TAPV and starting from stage Z3 DZ of complex No. 670;

4. Teleacceleration of NTZNP with action on one or 3-phase shutdown of 330 kV overhead line from the far end of overhead line with control of the parameters of stage Z3 of NTZNP of complex No.… protection REL670 with OAPV / TAPV and starting from the measuring device of 3 stage NTZNP of complex No.… protection REL670 ;

5. Fixing the disconnection of the line from its side of the overhead line and acting in the AFOL logic circuit of the complex No.… protection of relay protection and automation. Start from the output relay of the AFOL logic circuit of complex No.… protection of relay protection and automation devices when the line is disconnected from its side;

6. III stage of OH, acting on launch:
- 5th command of AKAP prd 232 kHz overhead line No. ...;
- 2nd command of AKPA prd 286 kHz overhead line No. ...;
- 4th team ANKA prd 342 kHz overhead line No.….

7. Fixation of the connection of the line from its side and action in the AFOL logic circuit of the complex № ... protection of relay protection and automation equipment of overhead lines with starting from the output relay of the AFOL logic circuit of the complex № ... protection of the relay protection and automation equipment VL-330 when switched on from its side;

8. Start-up from the 1st stage of the SAPAH scheme ... with the start:
- 6th team ANKA prd 348 kHz overhead line No. ...;
- 4th command of AKAP prd 122 kHz overhead line No.….

9. 3rd stage of load shedding with action ...

Each team is formed for the specific conditions of the overhead line, taking into account its configuration in the electrical network and operating conditions. RF output relays and switching devices are located in a separate cabinet.

Overhead line signaling circuits... Terminal alarms. On the front panel of the terminals there are 3 LEDs reflecting the state of the REL670 device itself and 15 LEDs indicating protection operations, faults and the state of the operational switches.

LEDs of terminals REL670 (protection of the 1st and 2nd complexes) and REC670 (automatic equipment and CBFP of the 1st and 2nd complexes B1 and B2) of the first six numbers are colored red. LEDs numbered 7 to 15 are yellow.

LEDs for status indication. 3 LED indicators “Ready”, “Start” and “Trip” are inserted above the LCD block of terminals REС670 and REL670. They light up in different colors to indicate different information. The green light indicates:

Device operation - steady glow;
- internal damage - by flashing;
- no power supply of the operating current - by dimming the color.

The yellow indicator color means:

Emergency recorder start - steady glow ;;
- finding the terminal in test mode - accompanied by blinking.

The red color of the indicator indicates the issuance of the emergency shutdown command (steady light).

REС670 terminal LED signaling table

Alarm reset and test... Resetting the alarm, counters for the reception and transmission of HF commands and information on the DZ and NTZNP zones for the terminal is made by pressing the SB1 button (alarm reset) on the front side of the cabinet.

To test the LEDs of REL670 (REС670) terminals, press and hold the SB1 button for more than 5 seconds.

General panel light signaling... On the front side of the REС670 cabinets there are lamps:
- HLW - works of automatic reclosure, ZNF, UROV;
- HLR2 - malfunction of the automation and breaker failure protection V-1 or V-2.

On the front side of REL670 cabinets there are lamps:
- HLW - protection works;
- HLR1 - protection complex disabled;
- HLR2 - malfunction of protection complexes.

On the front side of ETL cabinets there are alarm lamps:
- HLW1 - ETL malfunction of the 1st complex;
- HLW2 - ETL malfunction of the 2nd complex.

Prospects for the development of overhead power transmission line equipment... Time-tested air circuit breakers for high-voltage transmission lines are gradually being replaced by modern gas-insulated designs, which do not require constant operation of powerful compressor stations to maintain air pressure in tanks and air lines.

Bulky analog relay protection and automation devices for high-voltage equipment, which require close attention from the maintenance personnel, are being replaced by new microprocessor terminals.

The digital HF communication system MC04 − PLC is designed to organize telemechanics (TM) channels, data transmission (PD) and telephone channels (TF) over high-voltage power lines (PTL) of the 35/110 kV distribution network. The equipment provides data transmission over a high-frequency (HF) communication channel in the 4/8/12 kHz band in the frequency range 16-1000 kHz. The connection to the power transmission line is carried out according to the phase-earth scheme through the coupling capacitor and the connection filter. The connection of the high-frequency end of the equipment to the connection filter is unbalanced and is carried out with one coaxial cable.

The equipment is manufactured with a spaced and adjacent location of the transmission and reception bandwidths.

Functionality:

Number of HF channels 4 kHz wide - up to 3;
channel mode: analog (frequency division) and digital (time division);
modulation of low-frequency digital stream - QAM with division into 88 OFDM subcarriers;
HF spectrum modulation - amplitude with the transmission of one sideband of AM SSB;
adapting the bit rate of a digital stream (CPU) to a changing signal-to-noise ratio;
telephony interfaces: 4 ‒ wired 4W, 2 wired FXS / FXO;
the number of telephony channels in each HF channel - up to 3;
conversion of ADASE signaling into subscriber signaling FXS / FXO;
dispatching and subscriber connection under the ADASE protocol over one TF channel;
digital interfaces TM and data transmission: RS232, RS485, Ethernet;
control and monitoring interface - Ethernet;
built-in analyzer of RF path transmission / reception levels, error and temperature meter.
registration of faults and alarms in non-volatile memory;
digital re-reception - transit of channels at intermediate substations without quality loss;
monitoring - MC04 program ‒ Monitor: configuration, setting, diagnostics;
remote monitoring and configuration via built-in HF service channel;
SNMP support - when equipped with the S ‒ port network module;
radial and tree-like monitoring schemes for remote semi-sets;
power supply: mains ~ 220 V / 50 Hz or constant voltage 48/60 V.

Main settings
Operating frequency range 16 - 1000 kHz
Working bandwidth 4/8/12 kHz
Rated peak RF power 20/40 W
Maximum CPU transfer rate in 4 kHz bandwidth (adaptive) 23.3 kbps
The depth of AGC adjustment with an error rate of no more than 10–6 is not less than 40 dB.
Allowable line attenuation (including interference) 50 dB

Power consumption from a 220 V or 48 V power supply network - no more than 100 W.
The overall dimensions of the block are 485 * 135 * 215mm.
Weight no more than 5 kg.

Terms of Use:

- ambient temperature from +1 to + 45 ° С;
- relative humidity up to 80% at a temperature of plus 25 ° С;
- atmospheric pressure not lower than 60 kPa (450 mm Hg).

Equipment design and composition:

The digital three-channel HF communication system MC04-PLC includes two 19-inch 3U units, into which the following functional and structural units (boards) are installed:
IP01− power supply unit, network input 220V / 50Hz, output + 48V, -48V, + 12V;
IP02– power supply unit, input 36 ... 72V, output + 48V, -48V, + 12V;
MP02 - multiplexer of TM, PD, TF channels, G.729 codec, digital echo canceller;
MD02 - modulation / demodulation of the CPU into an analog RF signal, monitoring and control;
FPRM - linear transformer, attenuator and 4-loop PRM filter, PRM amplifier;
FPRD - 1/2 − x PRD loop filter, high impedance outside the PRD band;
UM02 - power amplifier, digital indication of TRD levels, alarm indication.
TP01 - transit of the content of the HF channel between the blocks, installed in place of the MP02 boards.

Ordering information

The number of MP02 boards corresponds to the number of basic HF channels with a 4 kHz bandwidth, configurable on the MD02 board - from 1 to 3. In case of transit of one of the HF channels between the blocks at the intermediate substation, a TP01 transit board is installed in place of the MP02 board, which provides reception / transmission of HF content channel without conversion to analog form.
The block has two main versions in terms of the peak power of the RF signal envelope:
1P - one UM02 amplifier and one FPRD filter are installed, the RF signal power is 20 W;
2P - two UM02 amplifiers and two FPRD filters are installed, the RF signal power is 40 W.

Block designation includes:
- the number of used HF channels 1/2/3;
- performance according to the peak power of the RF signal envelope: 1P - 20 W or 2P - 40 W;
- types of user joints for each of the 3 x HF channels / boards MP-02 or board TP01;
- supply voltage of the unit - mains ~ 220 V or constant voltage 48 V.
By default, the MP-02 board has digital interfaces RS232 and Ethernet, which are not indicated in the block designation .

The separation of the vertically integrated structure of the post-Soviet electric power industry, the complication of the control system, an increase in the share of small-generation electricity generation, new rules for connecting consumers (reducing the time and cost of connection), while increasing requirements for the reliability of power supply entails a priority attitude to the development of telecommunications systems.

In the energy industry, many types of communication are used (about 20) differing in:

• appointment,
• transmission medium,
• physical principles of work,
• the type of transmitted data,
• transmission technology.

Among all this diversity, high-frequency communication stands out through high-voltage power lines (OHL), which, unlike other types, was created by power specialists for the needs of the electric power industry itself. Equipment for other types of communication, originally created for public communication systems, to one degree or another, is adapted to the needs of power companies.

The very idea of \u200b\u200busing overhead lines for the distribution of information signals arose during the design and construction of the first high-voltage lines (since the construction of a parallel infrastructure for communication systems entailed a significant increase in cost), respectively, already at the beginning of the 20s of the last century, the first commercial HF communication systems were put into operation.

The first generation of HF communications was more like radio communications. The connection of the transmitter and receiver of high-frequency signals was carried out using an antenna up to 100 m long, suspended on supports parallel to the power wire. The overhead line itself was a guide for the HF signal - at that time, for the transmission of speech. Antenna connection was used for a long time to organize communication between emergency teams and on railway transport.

Further evolution of HF communication led to the creation of HF connection equipment:

• coupling capacitors and coupling filters, which made it possible to expand the band of transmitted and received frequencies,
• HF traps (barrage filters), which made it possible to reduce the influence of substation devices and overhead line inhomogeneities on the characteristics of the HF signal to an acceptable level, and, accordingly, improve the parameters of the HF path.

The next generations of channel-forming equipment began to transmit not only speech, but also telecontrol signals, protective commands of relay protection, emergency control equipment, and made it possible to organize data transmission.

As a separate type of HF communication, it was formed in the 40s and 50s of the last century. International Standards (IEC), guidelines for the design, development and manufacture of equipment have been developed. In the 70s in the USSR, the forces of such specialists as Shkarin Yu.P., Skitaltsev V.S. Mathematical methods and recommendations for calculating the parameters of HF channels were developed, which significantly simplified the work of design organizations in the design of HF channels and the choice of frequencies, and increased the technical characteristics of the introduced HF channels.

Until 2014, HF communication was officially the main type of communication in the electric power industry in the Russian Federation.

The emergence and implementation of fiber-optic communication channels, in the context of widespread high-frequency communication, has become a complementary factor in the modern concept of the development of communication networks in the electric power industry. At present, the relevance of HF communications remains at the same level, and intensive development and significant investments in optical infrastructure contribute to the development and formation of new areas of HF communications.

The indisputable advantages and the presence of a huge positive experience in the use of HF communication (almost 100 years) give reason to believe that the direction of HF will be relevant both in the near and in the long term, the development of this type of communication will allow solving both current problems and contributing to the development of the entire electric power industry. industry.